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ABSTRACT 
As work and organizational reality become increasingly “post-bureaucratic,” the conventional 
and stable bases of a person’s authority—their position, their expertise, or the acquiescence of a 
subordinate—are eroding. This evolution calls us to revise our understanding of authority, and to 
consider more deeply how it is achieved in contexts that are both fluid and fragmented. Building 
on a six-month autoethnography of a consulting assignment, we show that authority is a 
practical, relational, and situated performance. It exists in a tension between two mirroring 
processes, activation and passivation, through which relations are either leveraged or 
downplayed to shape the situation and steer collective action. Our study also reveals that the 
performance of authority involves not just people, but also a broader range of actants, including 
artifacts and abstract entities. In line with current research on performativity in organizations, our 
findings contribute to the relational program on authority and the revelation of its sociomaterial 
dimension. Thus, we provide an action-based understanding of authority that is better suited for 
the study of post-bureaucratic organizing. 
Keywords: Authority, Performativity, Relationality, Management consulting, Ethnography  
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Eero Vaara and the anonymous reviewers. They are also 
thankful for the feedback they received on earlier versions from Michel Callon, Antoine 
Hennion, Fabian Muniesa, Jean-François Harvey, Martha Feldman, Ann Langley, and Tor 
Hernes. The paper benefited greatly from the many constructive comments from the participants 
to the Montréal Organizations Writing Workshop (MOWW), and from the members of 
Université de Montréal’s Language, Organization and Governance research group. 
 
Thanks also to Tom Albrighton for his copyediting work and Dominique Fourcaudot-Poisson for 
help with the graph. 
 
This research was in part supported by the Fonds de Recherche du Québec – Société et Culture 
[grant number 2018-NP-206246]. 
  
THE PERFORMANCE OF AUTHORITY  3 
“And who are you?”: A performative perspective on authority in organizations 
 
And who are you, the proud lord said, that I must bow so low?  
– Lyrics to ‘The Rains of Castamere,’ the Lannisters’ song in Game of Thrones, from the novels 
by George R.R. Martin 
 
Authority has long been acknowledged as central to organizations and crucial for people to fulfill 
their work roles (Crozier, 1964; Follett, 1926; Weber, 1968). Historically, someone’s authority 
has been perceived as deriving from their hierarchical position (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Fayol, 
1949; Mintzberg, 1983). Alternatively, authority has been associated with people’s expertise 
(Barley, 1996; Bendix, 1956), or others’ acceptance of a communication as authoritative 
(Barnard, 1968; Simon, 1997). However, such theories assume the presence of stable bases for 
authority, and may not account for the contingencies of today’s working life, where 
organizations have become “post-bureaucratic” (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006). In such a 
context, workers must deal with a gradual erosion of the hierarchical basis of authority; instead 
of the clear rules laid down by hierarchy, control is increasingly exercised through broadly 
defined and emergent principles that are negotiated by peers with different occupational 
affiliations (Hodgson, 2004). The expertise basis for authority, while crucially important in 
technical work (Barley, 1996; Dobrajska, Billinger, & Karim, 2015; Huising, 2015), may be 
more relevant to engineers, technicians, and medical professionals than to management 
practitioners, whose knowledge base is more ambiguous (Alvesson, 1993). The circumstances of 
modern work, and the weakening of the structures and resources that guarantee unwavering 
authority, warrant a closer examination of how people practically orient collective action. 
A few studies have raised the question of authority in more fluid and fragmented 
contexts, such as self-managing teams (Fairhurst, Green, & Courtright, 1995), new cross-
disciplinary departments (Holm & Fairhurst, 2018), non-public agencies (Cooren, 2010), medical 
THE PERFORMANCE OF AUTHORITY  4 
surgery (Kellogg, 2009), or scientific laboratories (Huising, 2015). These works hint at the 
benefit of addressing authority from a relational perspective. Such a stance entails an 
examination of how people acquire “their properties only in relation to other subjects, social 
groups, or networks,” as opposed to more substantialist approaches that regard entities as being 
already constituted (Østerlund & Carlile, 2005: 92; see also Emirbayer, 1997; Kuhn, Ashcraft, & 
Cooren, 2017). Within this perspective, Huising (2014: 263) defines relational authority as “the 
capacity to elicit voluntary compliance with command.” In the case of the biosafety officers she 
studied, she shows that this capacity emerges not through esoteric knowledge or hierarchical 
position but through “scut work” (taking on menial tasks) that helps professionals relate to their 
clients. Similarly, in a study of surgeons struggling with a change process at their hospital, 
Kellogg (2009) suggests that a group’s authority can be gained by constituting “relational 
spaces” where colleagues can build a common sense of identity and control. These studies point 
to the relational features of authority by describing categories of macro-practices through which 
one professional group attempts to elicit compliance from another. There is a need for more 
focused research on the micro-processes through which relations contribute to an actor’s ability 
to orient collective action. Therefore, we ask: How does an actor effectuate authority when they 
lack the traditional endowments of expertise and hierarchy? 
Using an autoethnographic approach, we offer a detailed analysis of the work of a 
management consultant during a high-stakes corporate restructuring assignment. As an extreme 
case, a management consulting assignment offers a unique, information-rich context in which to 
study authority, for it exposes the limitations of more conventional perspectives. Consultants 
cannot benefit from institutional endorsement or rely on technical expertise as the sole basis of 
their authority (Bourgoin, 2015; Bourgoin & Harvey, 2018). Instead, they must find ways to 
make a difference without pre-established organizational legitimacy or leverage (Block, 2011). 
In order to experience intimately the processes by which authority is achieved in the situation, 
we adopted the unique vantage point afforded by the autoethnographic approach (Anderson, 
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2006). We collected data during a six-month large-scale restructuring assignment in which the 
first author participated as a consultant. In contrast to the traditional external observer role, 
autoethnography allows for a richer and more focused exploration of how an actor, immersed in 
a situation that was crucially important to them, performed their authority. Drawing from this 
original setting, we analyze 13 empirical episodes where the consultant’s authority was on trial, 
and delve into the micro-processes by which relations contributed to guiding collective action.  
We offer a performative theory of authority that builds on the profoundly relational 
ontology of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the Communicative Constitution of 
Organizations (CCO) tradition. We suggest that performing authority is the process by which an 
actor contributes to shaping a situation in such a way that it orients collective action. It emerges 
from the interplay between two micro-processes, which we name activation and passivation, 
through which relations to other actants, human or otherwise, are leveraged or downplayed. Our 
findings contribute to the literature on authority in three main ways. First, we offer a 
performative perspective that extends current work on relational authority (Huising, 2014, 2015; 
Kellogg, 2009) by specifying how relations become authoritative, and describing the micro-
processes through which a focal actor, even with no support from a professional group, may 
orient collective action. Second, we extend the literatures on ANT (Callon, 1986, 1991; Latour, 
1986) and CCO (Ashcraft, Kuhn, & Cooren, 2009; Holm & Fairhurst, 2018; Kuhn, 2008; Taylor 
& Van Every, 2014) by analyzing, at the level of the situation and with particular attention to 
discursive practices, how material-semiotic relations are woven by a focal actor to accomplish 
their authority in an organizational context. Finally, we offer an analytical approach to studying 
authority that cuts across static roles, hierarchy, and expertise, and is therefore better suited to 
work dynamics in post-bureaucratic contexts. 
THEORY: FROM THE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY TO ITS PERFORMANCE 
Authority scholars have long reflected on what might induce one person to follow the commands 
THE PERFORMANCE OF AUTHORITY  6 
of another. Answering this question would allow us to distinguish authority from both power—
which would imply coercion (Lukes, 1998)—and influence, which rests on the ability to 
substantively change someone’s beliefs (Simon, 1997). It would also reveal that authority is a 
broader concept than credibility. While authority and credibility are often seen as overlapping 
(Epstein, 1995), credibility has been principally conceptualized as emanating from an actor’s 
perceived believability and trustworthiness (Milewicz & Herbig, 1995), and is therefore less 
transactional than authority.  
Traditional views of authority have focused either on the sources of authority—formal 
position or expertise—or on recognizing its effect through its acceptance by others. In what 
follows, we review extant literature along these lines, before building on recent relational 
approaches—professional authority at work, actor-network theory, and communication studies—
to propose some elements of a performative understanding of authority.  
Traditional Views on Authority: Position, Expertise, and Acceptance 
The positional view of authority assumes that people are distributed within hierarchies, and that 
those who are higher up in such hierarchies, or their delegates, have “the right to give orders and 
the power to exact obedience” (Fayol, 1949: 63). People, therefore, draw their authority from an 
institutional or social space (Bourdieu, 1991; Thompson, 1956), from contractual arrangements 
(Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Albanese, 1966), or from the ownership of specific resources 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986). Those who can alter the social organization’s structures, whether 
formally or informally, therefore have more “authoritative resources” (Giddens, 1984: 258)—a 
notion that is shared by institutional work scholars (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; Rojas, 
2010). 
An alternative perspective posits expertise as the locus of the effective or actual exercise 
of authority (Aghion & Tirole, 1997; Bendix, 1956). In this view, authority “arises from an 
individual’s superior expertise, which is made up of specialized and often tacit knowledge that is 
difficult and costly to transfer among people” (Dobrajska et al., 2015: 688). Expert authority 
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relies on a person’s ability to access esoteric matters by dint of their specialized skills (Reed, 
1996) and their capacity to provide an immediate response to problems (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005). The relationship between expertise and authority may be traced to Foucault (1965), for 
whom experts produce knowledge that establish their own authority as true. In that sense, 
studying expertise means looking at the way experts produce the kind of knowledge that grants 
them authoritative status (as in medical expertise; see Eyal, 2013).  
Both the positional and expertise research streams tend to embrace a substantialist view 
of authority. One “has” authority because one occupies the right position or is endowed with the 
right expertise. However, such a possessive epistemology does not explain how these sources 
may have authoritative effects in the first place. Furthermore, the positional perspective fails to 
recognize the “uncertain and amorphous relationships” in organizations (French & Henning, 
1966: 187), where an increasing number of workers are located outside clear delegational 
hierarchies (Barley, 1996; Sturdy, Handley, Clark, & Fincham, 2009). Stability becomes the 
exception, not the norm, as people conduct their careers across several organizations (O’Mahony 
& Bechky, 2006) and as contract or temporary workers with nebulous relationships to the rest of 
the organization become more prevalent (Barley & Kunda, 2004). The expertise view, for its 
part, is mostly relevant to occupations that have clearly delimited “jurisdictional domains” that 
may be “constructed and policed” (Reed, 1996: 576). However, it is less relevant to management 
knowledge, which is contextualized, experience-based, and relies on complex interpersonal 
dynamics (Morris & Empson, 1998). 
Rather than concentrating exclusively on the sources of authority, some authors have 
suggested that authority depends on its acceptance by the subordinate, who must display some 
form of voluntary compliance or willingness to contribute (Simon, 1997; Weber, 1968). Indeed, 
“even under an extreme condition of battle, when the regime is nearly absolute, authority 
nevertheless rests upon the acceptance or consent of individuals” (Barnard, 1968: 164). In this 
respect, research has focused on identifying the most effective communication style to elicit 
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compliance from subordinates (Madlock, 2008). Other studies have tried to isolate the 
characteristics that impel someone to accept a leader’s authority, such as their own personality 
traits or cognitive patterns, or their perception of the leader’s emotional intelligence (e.g., 
Hetland, Sandal, & Johnsen, 2008; Milgram, 1974). Along this line of inquiry, Kahn and Kram 
(1994) suggest that individuals hold internal (psychological) models of authority that affect how 
they react to figures of authority under anxiety-generating situations.  
Acceptance theories also substantialize authority in their own way by focusing on the 
other pole of the relation, and by reducing it either to a communicative formula or to specific 
cognitive mechanisms. Additionally, these approaches typically assume a stable context in which 
a situation of authority exists and the roles of superior and subordinate are already established. 
While such assumptions are necessary for the experiment- or survey-based studies that give the 
acceptance perspective its empirical grounding, real-life situations are rarely as predictable. A 
prime example is consulting, where roles are fuzzy, knowledge is experiential, order-giving and 
order-taking are conflated, and the outcome is all that matters. There is a growing need to assess 
the way that authority is put into practice in real-life situations, and to document the “effective 
use of authority” (Albanese, 1966: 138). By looking at the way daily interactions unfold, we may 
avoid reducing authority to any of its components, and identify processes that cut across 
organizational forms and roles.  
Toward a Performative View of Authority 
Rather than locating authority in either its sources or its acceptance, several studies suggest that 
authority lies in the practical enactment of relations between individuals, and between those 
individuals and elements of their environment. Several streams may be identified within the 
research focusing on relational authority. The first is found in the sociology of profession, and 
builds on detailed empirical studies of authority struggles involving technical experts. For 
instance, Huising (2014) describes how a research laboratory’s administrative personnel 
undermined safety experts’ authority through “censure episodes”—i.e. patterned communicative 
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endeavors presenting these experts’ practices as misaligned with the organization’s goals. In the 
same setting, Huising (2015) shows that biosafety officers’ authority over lab technicians did not 
rely on abstract technical skills, but rather on “scut work”—a term that describes mundane 
maintenance tasks that facilitate relationships with clients. In the same vein, Kellogg (2009) 
analyzed how, as their hospital went through a major reform, a group of surgeons and interns 
challenged their superiors’ authority by leveraging “relational spaces”—informal and private 
locations, such as vacant conference rooms or spots at a cafeteria—where they could collectively 
mobilize across formal ranks and build an oppositional repertoire.     
These studies have the merit of shifting attention towards authority as it is exercised in 
relation to those who are not necessarily subordinates, such as clients, experts, or even 
hierarchical superiors. Adopting such a perspective would lead us to expect that the consultant in 
our case achieves authority by aligning his actions with the organization’s goals; by focusing on 
support tasks that build proximity with staff members; and by cementing a group identity in free, 
informal spaces. However, by focusing on authority as compliance with command (Huising, 
2014: 2014), this stream remains close to the acceptance perspective. Additionally, these studies 
mostly focus on the macro-practices through which technical experts build their group’s 
authority against a clear opposing group. A distinctive aspect of our context is that the consultant 
we observe is the sole representative of his profession within the client organization, that his 
alignment with any particular group there is far from given. Besides, in contrast with technical 
experts, who have a clear domain of jurisdiction over a set of abstract technical skills, the 
consultant’s managerial expertise is not clearly distinct from that of high-level managers within 
the client organization (Bourgoin & Harvey, 2018). In such a context, what are the micro-
processes through which people build their authority without the endowments of formal ranks, 
differentiated expertise, or group support? 
Elements for a relational understanding of authority may also be found in actor-network 
theory (ANT), which views social reality as the outcome of material-semiotic relations. For ANT 
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scholars, authority lies in associations. In this sense, the distinction between someone “having” 
authority and others deferring to their command does not hold: If you “have” authority—in 
potentia—nothing happens, and when you exercise authority—in actu—“others are performing 
the action and not you” (Latour, 1986: 264). ANT’s shift towards relationality is ontological, 
since it contends that any single actor, as far as action is concerned, is already a network of many 
other “actants” that share their agency with them. The term “actant” refers to “anything that 
makes a difference in the situation” (Latour, 1987), including both human beings and other 
entities. Empirical studies taking an ANT perspective have focused on the way a person or group 
becomes authoritative by enrolling the agency of a network of actants into their own (Callon, 
1986). For instance, a scientist’s authority is the result of their ability to funnel the agency of 
microbes, measurement instruments, budgetary conditions, corporate actors, and so on into their 
own actions (Latour, 1988). ANT’s perspective has been described as “pluralistic” (Denis, 
Langley, & Rouleau, 2007) and embraces a truly relational view of society that seeks to explain 
the emergence of hierarchies and social positions, instead of presuming them (Gond & Nyberg, 
2017).  
ANT has inspired a perspective in the field of organizational communication known as 
the Communicative Constitution of Organization (CCO) approach, which suggests that 
organizing is a co-orienting effort that relies on the interplay between conversation and texts. 
This last stream of research suggests that people may become authoritative by making “figures” 
(i.e. ideas, documents, methods, etc.) present in their interactions, thus giving additional weight 
to their own actions (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009). Just like the ventriloquist who makes their 
dummy “speak,” the person who speaks on behalf of another and summons their name, position, 
or idea in conversation is channeling that person’s authority to support their own course of action 
(Cooren, 2010). People enroll figures through speech, as when they refer to a rule or invoke a 
prior agreement, but also through the use of documents such as meeting minutes or contracts 
(Cooren, Bencherki, Chaput, & Vásquez, 2015; Cooren & Matte, 2010). Taken together, these 
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figures form “texts”—either concrete artifacts or tacit understandings—that may become 
authoritative if they are upheld to guide the actions of the collective (Kuhn, 2008, 2012; Holm & 
Fairhurst, 2018). In this vein, recent studies on the agency of texts show their “force potential” to 
shape the organization (Vaara, Sorsa, & Pälli, 2010).  
Drawing on the common etymology of “authority” and “authorship,” CCO research 
highlights that when people produce authoritative texts, they are also co-authoring their 
organization in the sense that they continuously define and enact its purpose (Taylor & Van 
Every, 2014: 27). Authority, then, is less about one person telling another what to do, than about 
their agreement to take instructions from a third: the organization that they constitute by 
producing authoritative texts (Taylor & Van Every, 2014). Indeed, agency in any given situation 
always “vacillates” or “oscillates” between different actants contributing to a joint authorship of 
action (Cooren, 2010; Taylor & Van Every, 2014). This idea aligns with earlier communication 
studies on relational control (Courtright, Fairhurst, & Rogers, 1989; Fairhurst et al., 1995) that 
looked at the concrete ways in which people use discursive practices to author the situation in 
which collective action takes place. For instance, Courtright et al. (1989) demonstrated that in 
mechanistic systems, managers tend to impose a reading of the situation through commands and 
assertions, while negotiating it through questions/answers and conversational elaboration in more 
organic ones (see also Fairhurst et al., 1995). These studies suggest that authority is an outcome 
of struggles “over the meaning to be assigned to situations, including whose and which ideas 
(read, authored acts) are going to prevail vis-a-vis the task at hand” (Holm & Fairhurst, 2018: 
696). Authority displays, in turn, must be captured at the interactional level, in the acceptance or 
rejection of such authorship through communication (Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst & Uhl-Bien, 
2012).   
The relational ontology of ANT and CCO invites us to uncover the details of how the 
consultant in our case draws on his relations with others in order to give weight to his own 
actions. Authority, in this sense, is understood as being “grounded in action” (Fairhurst & 
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Putnam, 2004) and as taking place between people (and other actants) in a transactional manner. 
Conversely, resistance and delegitimation are also constituted in each situation through 
interaction (Vaara & Monin, 2010; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). ANT and CCO, therefore, 
predict that the consultant’s authority will result from a negotiation between his ability to enroll 
others’ agency through speech, writing, and artifacts—for instance, by invoking authoritative 
texts—and others’ resistance to such enrollment. Empirical research in ANT, though, has mainly 
focused on large-scale technical and scientific controversies (e.g., Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 
2009) and, while the concept lies at the heart of ANT, the theory’s potential to study authority as 
such has yet to be explored. CCO, for its part, has suggested that making figures present in 
interaction and weaving authoritative texts may grant authority, but has yet to identify the 
general micro-processes by which an actor may leverage relations to orient collective actions, 
and whether there are moments when authority requires figures to be effaced or resisted. Such 
general micro-processes may take us beyond discursive practices and conversation analysis, to 
encompass a broader range of relational practices, actants, and situations.  
We define the performance of authority as the process by which an actor contributes to 
shaping a situation in such a way that it orients collective actions. This shaping is relational and 
implies the aligning of various actants. In this sense, authority is a situated performance and it is 
effectuated through continuous (inter)actions. While there are multiple perspectives on 
performativity, ranging from discourse to sociomateriality (Gond, Cabantous, Harding, & 
Learmonth, 2016), they share a concern for the practical accomplishment of the phenomenon 
under study. In line with ANT and CCO theorists, we adopt this performative view of authority, 
which posits that reality is an outcome of material-semiotic relations in the making, without 
reducing it to any particular source, disposition, or communicative formula (Ashcraft & Kuhn, 
2017; Hennion, 2007; Taylor & Van Every, 2011). Such a view reveals that a focal actor relates 
to various actants (people, artifacts, and abstract entities) through the microprocesses of 
activation and passivation, in order to shape situations and orient collective actions. This 
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performative take is particularly relevant to our case, which traces the actions of a consultant 
thrown into a complex organizational setting with no notable authoritative endowment.  
METHODS 
We follow Clifford Geertz’s (1973) advice to offer “thick descriptions” of the realities we study; 
we describe not only the action itself, but also its meaning for the participants. We choose to 
rely, in particular, on autoethnography, because high-level encounters between consultants and 
their clients are rarely accessible by external observers (Sturdy & Wright, 2011). 
Autoethnography combines elements of autobiographical and retrospective stances to reveal 
organizational processes, uncover organizational deadlocks, and account for the vicarious nature 
of organizational relations (Boyle & Parry, 2007). In this vein, we describe the content and 
meaning of certain moments where the consultant’s authority was on trial, regardless of the 
outcome. By paying equal attention to both more- and less-conclusive performances, we follow 
an intuition put forward by ANT: that breakdowns allow for the unpacking of taken-for-granted 
and “black-boxed” features of reality (Latour, 2005). 
The choice of this approach was also motivated by a recent body of literature that points 
to the necessity of “relaxing the taboo of telling our own stories” (Anteby, 2013) and emphasizes 
the value of autoethnography for grasping power relations in organizations (Alvesson, 2009; 
Prasad, 2013). Research conducted from an external vantage point risks attributing authority to 
its externally visible signals, such as expertise or structural positions. If authority is a 
performance, not a pre-constituted object available for external appraisal, then it must be traced 
from the specific viewpoint of the focal actor, to gain a more complete understanding of the 
micro-processes that only a reflexive account can provide. 
Autoethnography poses, in the most acute way, the “involvement paradox”—the need to 
get close enough to the field to understand it, yet remain distant enough to analyze it and avoid 
biases. It pushes qualitative researchers to make choices in the way they represent involvement 
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in their accounts (Langley & Klag, 2017). We believe that autoethnography need not be 
“evocative” (Ellis, 1997) or “political” (Denzin, 2003; Reed-Danahay, 1997); it can also be what 
Anderson (2006) termed “analytical.” Our commitment to analytic autoethnography insists on 
the researcher’s status as entirely visible within the text. It also puts particular emphasis on 
dialogue with informants beyond the self and commitment to theoretical analysis, in order to 
avoid authorial solipsism (Anderson, 2006). In Van Maanen’s (1988) terminology, the “tale” we 
tell is in more of a “realist” than a “confessional” genre, since our main point of focus is the 
situation and the way the first author interacted with its participants. 
Empirical setting 
Consulting represents a fertile setting in which to reveal the performative nature of authority, as 
management consultants must interact with people at all hierarchical ranks without holding any 
particular position of their own, as well as juggling various fields of expertise. As such, 
consultants find themselves in liminal and ambiguous situations, acting as external post-
bureaucratic agents of change in a typically bureaucratic client organization (Czarniawska & 
Mazza, 2003). Consultants are faced with the paradox of “making a difference when [they] do 
not have direct control” (Block, 2011: 190), and without a clear work position (Barley & Kunda, 
2004). Despite their reliance on “authoritative knowledge” (Kipping & Engwall, 2002), and 
unlike more traditional experts such as lawyers and doctors, consultants can hardly draw on 
external credentials such as standardized education, training, and qualifications as the foundation 
of their professional or occupational authority (von Nordenflycht, 2010). Consultants’ 
managerial knowledge has been described as “weak” and “ambiguous” (Alvesson, 1993; Clark 
& Fincham, 2002), as well as undifferentiated from that of their clients, making it harder for 
them to claim a clear domain of jurisdiction over abstract technical skills as a ground for their 
authority (see Bourgoin & Harvey, 2018 for a review). Almost by definition, they enter 
situations where strife is rampant, where progress has ground to a halt, and where many actors 
view the involvement of an external consultant with suspicion. Establishing authority is, thus, a 
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sine qua non for the consultant’s success—yet it always involves a risk of failure. 
Consistent with our analytical approach to autoethnography, we use the codename 
“Thomas” to depersonalize the first author’s account and maintain distance between his dual 
positions as analyst and character in the events being analyzed. Our case consists of an 
assignment that Thomas conducted as part of ConsultCorp, a mid-sized consulting firm with 
around 150 consultants and a 25-million-euro turnover (all company and individual names are 
pseudonyms). ConsultCorp provides generalist management advice in various fields, from 
banking to healthcare. It specializes in “transformation” assignments, during which it helps 
executives implement long-term, complex programs. These may consist of post-merger 
integration, reorganization, adaptation to market deregulation, and so on.  
Our focal assignment dealt with the restructuring of EnergyCorp, a mid-size energy 
group employing 630 people for a 300-million-euro turnover. EnergyCorp had recently been 
acquired by MotherCorp, a world-leading French multinational in the energy sector, with more 
than 15,000 employees and a 3.5-billion-euro turnover. Both companies’ core business dealt with 
the conception, setup, and management of sophisticated heating systems for institutional clients 
(including cities and hospitals, for instance) and individual customers. MotherCorp engaged in a 
restructuring program to integrate its newly acquired subsidiary. The main objective was to 
streamline EnergyCorp’s activities to meet MotherCorp’s standards and thereby reduce operating 
costs drastically. While the guidelines of the restructuring program were defined ahead of time 
by MotherCorp’s top executives, Thomas’s assignment was to conceive and implement 20 
functional and operational projects, at both EnergyCorp’s headquarters and decentralized 
operational centers (heating plants), that would eventually lead to the subsidiary’s integration 
and the streamlining of operations. Projects included reworking EnergyCorp’s organizational 
structure, reviewing personnel roles, optimizing core and support functions (including finance 
and sales), upgrading the IT system, and multiple projects to improve operational centers.  
Thomas was hired by Henri, MotherCorp’s Chief Strategy Officer, but his day-to-day 
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client was Gerard, EnergyCorp’s CEO. Thomas was the only full-time consultant operating on 
EnergyCorp’s premises, with the status of senior consultant, and occasional support from 
Charles, a manager at ConsultCorp (approximately half a day per week). A single consultant 
might seem a modest commitment, given the scale of the project—but Henri wanted to maintain 
tight control over “his” consultant, whom he personally trusted from a prior assignment, and 
support him with a team of internal experts rather than rely on external resources.  
Specifically, Thomas was in charge of two kinds of tasks: (1) steering the overall 
restructuring program—for example, by facilitating executive committee meetings and 
producing high-level strategic documents; (2) more operational tasks related to the management 
of each project, involving internal teams and the production of specific deliverables 
(organization charts, a People Review tool, etc.). He also played a mediator role by transposing 
executive directives to the field, conveying members’ concerns to the top management team, and 
making sure functional teams spoke to each other. In our findings, we offer a detailed description 
of the consultant’s activities as part of the restructuring program, and an analysis of the micro-
processes he used to establish his authority. 
Data collection  
Access to the site was made possible by Thomas’s professional participation in the restructuring 
assignment. He was appointed at EnergyCorp in the context of a three-year work contract with 
ConsultCorp, which was supported by a government program aimed at increasing research 
within French businesses. Thomas worked as a full-time consultant on several assignments, the 
EnergyCorp assignment being one of them, affording him the opportunity to collect first-hand 
empirical data. ConsultCorp partners, close colleagues, and clients were aware of Thomas’s 
research activity, but none had a personal or organizational stake in its outcome. He was given 
full access providing he didn’t use a recording device and kept the research results entirely 
anonymous. Overall, Thomas’ colleagues and clients treated him as a “regular” professional 
consultant, since he cost the same rate, worked the same hours, and was subject to the same 
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performance requirements. 
The first author collected empirical material in 2011, over a span of six months (the 
duration of the EnergyCorp assignment). As the consultant in charge of the restructuring 
program, he had unparalleled access to a wide array of data sources. While data collection may 
be more easily bracketed and tracked in traditional qualitative research (counting the number of 
interviews, the duration of recordings, etc.), Thomas’s involvement in the field meant that every 
meeting, project, or document of the restructuring program was a potential source of data. In a 
typical day, Thomas would arrive at 8am and leave at 9pm, attend as many as 10 meetings, and 
prepare several notes, reports, or memos. This rich data set included (1) observations made 
across the full range of formal and informal settings that make up the bulk of consulting practice 
(meetings with clients and colleagues, work sessions, appointments with managers, etc.); (2) 
field documents (emails, memos, deliverables, strategy notes, etc.); and (3) informal 
conversations with insiders. We triangulated these data to support the empirical episodes 
described in the findings, as illustrated in Table 1.   
---------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here ----------------------------------------------- 
 
Observations. Thomas took field notes of what he observed while working and meeting 
with a variety of actors. Field notes were taken on the spot as part of consulting work or shortly 
afterwards, depending on what seemed appropriate. They comprised factual descriptions and 
recollections of events and conversations, as well as more egotic perceptions of what was going 
on (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011). Taking field notes was not obtrusive, since consultants often 
play the role of “recording machines” (Starbuck, 1992), and since producing minutes for 
meetings was one of Thomas’s tasks. Thomas kept a diary throughout the period of observation, 
resulting in over 300 single-spaced pages of field notes, classified chronologically and then 
thematically. After work and during weekends, Thomas typed out the handwritten notes on his 
computer and consolidated a narrative while adding initial theoretical insights to the story. 
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Thomas entered the field with the aim of understanding “value creation” in consulting work and 
collected data during the first weeks of observation in rather general terms. When he realized that 
establishing authority was instrumental to his work, Thomas focused the data collection on this 
specific issue.  
Field documents. Thomas systematically collected his working documents, amounting to 
a total of 26GB of data archived on a hard drive. They comprised: professional emails; the 
restructuring masterplan (new structure and organization charts); auditing reports for operational 
centers and functional departments; due diligences for operational centers; and restructuring 
tools developed using Microsoft’s Excel spreadsheet software and the Access database system; 
as well as presentations, minutes, memos, etc. for the various projects. Thomas kept the 
successive versions of key documents as they evolved from draft to final versions. Field 
documents were pivotal to the analysis: They stabilize the meaning given to situations by various 
actors and complement more interpretative observations. Field documents were duly anonymized 
and reconstructed when used for research purposes.  
Informal conversations. Thomas refrained from conducting structured interviews while 
working as a consultant, so as not to create confusion between his two roles in the field. 
However, as a full-time consultant, he had many conversations with informants at various levels 
of the organization that can be considered as open-ended, informal interviews (124 of which are 
reported in his fieldnotes). Such conversations were friendly chats supported by what Spradley 
(1979: 60) calls “contrast” questions—i.e. those focusing on the meaning of an event for 
informants. In addition, in the few months following the end of the six-month assignment, 
Thomas had nine follow-up meetings (usually friendly lunches) with EnergyCorp’s CEO (one 
meeting); Barbara, the quality engineer (three meetings); Henri (three meetings) at MotherCorp; 
and Charles, his manager at ConsultCorp (two meetings). These meetings allowed Thomas to dig 
deeper into specific episodes of the story, validate his recollection of events, and seek additional 
information.    
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Three steps of data analysis  
Broadly speaking, our analysis comprised three main steps. Following a grounded theory 
approach, these steps did not form a strict sequence, but rather a constant back-and-forth between 
the data and the theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Besides, in line with 
analytic autoethnography (Anderson, 2006), our analysis was driven by a collaborative effort to 
balance the first author’s involvement with an outside perspective, in an effort towards theory-
building (Wadham & Warren, 2014). We therefore created an “insider-outsider” research team 
(Evered & Louis, 1981) with a new author entering the team at each step of the data analysis. 
The first step of analysis was done by the first author during data collection. It resulted in 
the production of a coherent narrative of 167 single-spaced pages: a chronological and highly 
descriptive “raw story,” presenting events and ideas that Thomas felt were interesting in his 
work. Throughout this first narrative, the tensions surrounding authority in practice appeared 
consistently in a variety of forms: positioning adequately, satisfying clients, gaining legitimacy 
as an outsider, juggling expertise, moving ahead with tasks, overcoming resistance in 
coordination, etc. These events were translated into 34 episodes (situations, projects, meetings, 
etc.) where the issue of the consultant’s authority came to the forefront. 
The second step consisted in coding these episodes using open coding techniques (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). It was at this point that the second author joined the research team. During 
multiple meetings, he critically reviewed, validated, and evaluated Thomas’s notes and 
recollections. The two authors considered that establishing authority was constantly at risk of 
failure, and that moments of contention were especially interesting. Together, they narrowed 
down the number of episodes to 13. These were chosen because they illustrate moments where 
authority was on trial and where the consultant had to readjust his relation to actants, making it 
necessary to describe the temporal unfolding of events. Moving between the various sources of 
data available, the authors thoroughly rewrote these episodes in order to flesh them out with 
more empirical evidence. Both authors made sure that any “enhancements” made to Thomas’s 
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story for the sake of comprehensibility did not sacrifice its correspondence to facts (Humphreys 
& Watson, 2009). These first rounds of coding made them realize that authority involved human 
beings, but also material artifacts and seemingly abstract entities such as principles and rules. At 
this point, the research team felt it was necessary to go back to the data and proceed to a more 
systematic axial and selective coding of the episodes (Corbin & Strauss, 2015) to understand 
how the various actants were set in motion in order to establish authority. This led to the 
definition of first-order categories (mobilizing or distancing from human allies; equipping or 
gearing down from material artifacts; and invoking or revoking abstract entities) and second-
order processes (activation and passivation) mapping out the ways in which the consultant 
related to various actants. 
The third author then joined the research team. During multiple meetings and working 
sessions, he offered a new and more theoretical take on the analysis produced so far. He 
specifically challenged the existing codes and tested whether they were supported by the data. 
He also underlined the need to identify the way situations changed following the consultant’s 
contribution, and whether or not they had guided collective action in the directions he was 
hoping for. Accounting for both outcomes allowed us to avoid the pitfall of observing only 
successful performances (by Thomas’s expectations), which would generate a one-sided and 
somewhat tautological theory. At this point, we proceeded collectively with the writing of the 
paper, which is indeed an integral part of the research: Ethnography is not done in the field and 
then written down; ethnography is writing (Humphreys & Watson, 2009). Although we adopt a 
performative and relational approach, we tell the story from Thomas’s point of view due to our 
autoethnographic method and to present a meaningful narrative of events and situations. This is 
not to imply that other actants did not have agency in the situation, or contribute to the 
performance of authority. The problem here is not one of who or what has agency, but how to 
make sense, as humans, of a story involving humans, while at the same time decentering the 
source of action and intention (e.g., Callon & Law, 1995). Moreover, presenting data in the form 
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of episodes could give the impression that authority happens—or breaks down—in a series of 
segmented occasions. We stress that authority is a continuous performance, and that we are using 
episodes only as an analytical bracketing device. 
EMPIRICAL EPISODES: RELATING TO VARIOUS ACTANTS TO ORIENT COLLECTIVE ACTION 
EnergyCorp’s restructuring program was radical because the group had to be brought into line 
with MotherCorp’s standards in all aspects of business and operations within a brief period. This 
meant reshuffling structures, procedures, and tools all at once, while cutting operating costs and 
letting go nearly half of the employees. At the peak of the program, more than 20 different 
projects were in progress concurrently. Despite the significance of the restructuring plan—
particularly for employees whose livelihoods were at risk—this radical shift was enacted 
progressively, through the consultant’s ordinary tasks: attending meetings, producing various 
analyses and documents, coordinating staff members on specific projects, and so on. While they 
may appear mundane, these tasks were instrumental to a program that led to the gradual 
assimilation of a 630-employee company.  
Table 2 describes the 13 episodes in which Thomas attempted to orient collective action 
in a variety of contexts. For each one, we provide additional evidence in terms of quotes and 
field-note extracts in Table 3. Together, these tables provide the empirical basis for our analytical 
categories. We chose to develop six of these episodes in order to elucidate the key points of our 
analysis through thick description. That way, we could showcase the richness of our data and 
transport the reader into Thomas’s experience. We selected these six episodes because they are 
important turning points in the restructuring program. Episodes 1 and 2 focus on Thomas’s day-
to-day attempts to orient collective action with two significant groups of insiders—operational 
staff members and top managers—while he pushes forward specific projects. Episodes 3 and 4 
consider Thomas’s coordination of the politically sensitive “People Review project,” which 
aimed at letting employees go and therefore put a lot of pressure on participants. Finally, 
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Episodes 5 and 6 look at a technical controversy where the consultant was asked to choose 
between two different options for a new IT system.  
       ------------------------------ Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here----------------------------- 
Relating to human allies  
As he carried out his work, Thomas could rely on a variety of people to augment his capacity to 
act, so to speak, and contributed to guiding collective action. The precise way in which he related 
to these individuals, however, varied greatly depending on the precise challenges he faced, the 
audience he had to deal with, and other aspects of the situation. In the following two vignettes, 
we focus on his relationship with one person, Barbara, with whom he worked closely, but whose 
contribution was equivocal. 
Empirical episode 1: “I need my insider expert.” As part of the restructuring program, Thomas 
took responsibility for designing and implementing a new organizational structure that 
consolidated EnergyCorp’s operational centers from 12 to four, reducing the firm’s headcount by 
nearly half in the process. The centers’ staff resisted the proposed plan in several project 
meetings, arguing that Thomas, as an outsider, lacked familiarity with EnergyCorp’s day-to-day 
business, and that he was merely implementing headquarters’ requirements, which had no 
practical relevance. MotherCorp’s Chief Strategy Officer, Henri, had assigned Barbara, an 
experienced quality engineer with 10 years’ field experience at various production sites, to help 
Thomas with support tasks. Thomas quickly realized that Barbara had a unique knowledge of 
operations, as well as wide-ranging contacts within the organization. He understood that relating 
to her by closely collaborating with her would allow him to bring her knowledge of day-to-day 
operations into the conversation, thus making his change proposals more practically applicable 
and aligned with the concerns of the workers. During project meetings with operational workers, 
Thomas consistently invited Barbara, sat next to her at the table, and entrusted her with fleshing 
out his recommendations for new plant organization and procedures. He would highlight her 
contribution to their shared work, publicly crediting her as his main informant for technical facts, 
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cosigning reports with her, and actively building on her past engineering work to substantiate his 
requests. The pair would also regularly have lunch together at the EnergyCorp cafeteria, where 
Barbara would initiate informal conversations with skeptical colleagues who would get a chance 
to understand Thomas’s role. By mobilizing her in all aspects of the restructuring process, 
Thomas considered Barbara his partner, and presented her as his “inside expert” when addressing 
workers from operational sites.  
Working in close contact with Barbara allowed Thomas to overcome operational 
workers’ resistance in situations where he was seen as an outsider. He was able not only to save 
time on the usual stages of trust-building, but also to relate to employees as a colleague who 
shared their concerns. For instance, during an auditing process at one of the operational centers, 
Barbara helped Thomas to access most of the finance department’s staff without having to ask 
permission from the financial director, and led several interviews jointly with Thomas. This 
allowed technical details to be ironed out, and helped reassure participants about the objectives 
of the project. As Barbara told Thomas with respect to an interview with an accountant who 
refused to align with the newly defined accounting process: “Because I was there, she skipped 
straight to the problems with the analytical structure of the financial statements with you […]. 
One of the accountants was certainly unhappy with the new process, as it meant making 
significant changes to her routine, yet she resigned herself to adjust to it when she saw I was also 
involved” (field notes, informal conversation, May 2011). Thomas observed a rapid and 
consistent effect from relating to Barbara when it came to orienting projects with the accounting 
department, as illustrated by an operational worker who mentioned in front of his colleagues: 
“You guys at the project team are doing a good job. Everyone’s willing to collaborate with you 
since Barbara helps take our technical requirements into account” (field notes, project meeting, 
July 2011).  
Empirical episode 2: “You need to keep her at bay.” While relating to Barbara allowed the 
course of action to be altered when working with operational workers, top executives did not see 
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the quality engineer’s participation in sensitive restructuring matters in such a positive light. 
During the weekly executive committee meeting, as Thomas was presenting his draft of a new 
structure for operational centers, he publicly referred to Barbara as a source of ideas. This 
incurred the wrath of the CFO, who dryly remarked that “EnergyCorp was paying for consulting 
advice, not Barbara’s two cents on the organization of plants” (field notes, executive meeting, 
June 2011). In another executive meeting, as Thomas was presenting instructions for 
streamlining the sales process due to reduced headcount, the Sales Director accused him of 
“missing the big picture” (field notes, executive meeting, June 2011) with his emphasis on 
Barbara’s analysis of operations. Following these events, it gradually dawned on Thomas that 
executives had little interest in field-oriented input from staff members like Barbara. On the 
contrary, they favored consulting models and “outside comparisons in the form of 
benchmarking” (field notes, informal conversation with CEO, July 2011). Thomas also noted, 
when talking with the Sales Director, that Barbara was “tainted” in the eyes of executives, who 
blamed her for having a rather “procedural and persnickety approach to quality management 
issues” (field notes, informal conversation, June 2011). 
Both Thomas and Henri were concerned about this turn of events, which they had not 
expected. They concluded that if the consultant remained too closely associated with Barbara, he 
would not be able to convince EnergyCorp’s upper management that, although his 
recommendations were operationally sound, they were also fully aligned with their higher-level 
viewpoint on the restructuring process. As Henri advised him, “Don’t let Barbara introduce you 
to the executives and top managers. You need to keep her at bay. She will harm your image more 
than anything else” (field notes, informal conversation, June 2011). Despite his fondness for 
Barbara, and his continuing reliance on her valuable information and advice in their joint work, 
Thomas accepted Henri’s suggestion. He started distancing himself from Barbara on many 
occasions and emphasized his own role in shaping business recommendations instead. For 
instance, he attended several executive committees and project meetings on his own, putting 
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forward his own models and analyses, as well as showcasing Henri’s contributions to the project. 
Showing strong team spirit, and “having read the same signs from executives” (field notes, 
informal conversation, June 2011), Barbara conceded that the project would progress more 
favorably if Thomas handled the top floor on his own. In this vein, she agreed, for example, not 
to have her name mentioned in documents intended for high-ranking managers, while she 
continued to take charge of relations with the production plants. 
Summary: Mobilizing and distancing from human allies. These first two episodes show 
that Barbara was instrumental to Thomas’s ability to orient collective action when working with 
a variety of employees. Yet, she was not a well-defined “resource,” since neither her knowledge 
nor her connections could grant authority to the consultant once and for all. While Barbara’s 
operational expertise had a lot of traction with staff members and frontline workers, that very 
same expertise also appeared removed from the concerns of top executives when they considered 
whether to adopt a given program of actions.  
Thomas was caught in a dilemma: While he needed Barbara’s help, he also had to keep 
her at arm’s length. However, what Thomas intuitively understood is that this was not a binary 
choice. What mattered was not only whether he related to Barbara, but also how he did so, 
depending on the situation. As the episodes show, on certain occasions, the consultant mobilized 
her through a variety of practices that were integral to their collaboration, such as attending 
meetings or conducting interviews together; contributing jointly to analyses and to the 
production of deliverables; crediting her as a source of information during meetings; and so 
forth. This mobilization could be witnessed in several encounters, from the more mundane 
(lunches or coffee breaks with workers) to the more strategic (project meetings or formal 
introductions). On other occasions, such as those following Henri’s pointed warning, Thomas 
was distancing himself from Barbara. He would then tone down her role and contribution to the 
project and highlight different sources of information and his proximity to others, such as Henri.  
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Relating with material artifacts 
Thomas was also able to count on a variety of artifacts that, in some situations, turned out to 
contribute to his ability to steer collective action in the direction he hoped for. The next two 
vignettes focus on Thomas’s use of a software application that not only helped him manage one 
aspect of the restructuring process, but also led people to follow his recommendations. 
Empirical episode 3: “The tool did the job.” What was known as the “People Review project” 
was the most politically sensitive part of the restructuring program that Thomas had to carry out. 
In view of the impending redesign of the organization, it consisted of evaluating and reassigning 
employees, and letting go nearly half of them. Once these goals became known, a strong 
counterblast arose, as did frequent coordination breakdowns among the many individuals 
involved in the project.  
First, executives sought to protect their turf by shielding their own people. They also 
fought over where certain key employees should be reassigned. For instance, the Sales Director 
and the Technical Director both wanted the engineers from the design bureau (who had a dual 
technical and commercial role) in their department. They ended up vociferously arguing with 
each other in front of Thomas during a project meeting. Second, executives had to cope with the 
tension between the ever-changing blueprint of the future organization and EnergyCorp’s current 
organizational structure. They spent several project meetings advocating for competing staffing 
plans, quarreling over organizational charts, and failing to agree on a common vision. Thomas, 
who was leading the project, was in a difficult position due to his outsider status and his limited 
knowledge of the employees. When he tried to meet personally with the executives to advance 
decisions, they would push back and argue that they did not “need to be told how to organize 
their own departments, that resource allocation was their prerogative, and that the project was too 
political for him to take charge” (field notes, informal conversation with the Sales Director, June 
2011).    
Given the complexity of the People Review project, Thomas created a computerized tool 
THE PERFORMANCE OF AUTHORITY  27 
to support the decision process. The software kept track of each employee’s current 
organizational position and allowed a dynamic modeling of how they would move to a new 
location within the new structure. The tool made possible all kinds of simulations, optimizations, 
and calculations.  
After a few weeks, Thomas realized that using the People Review tool gave him the 
unexpected ability to unite otherwise feuding parties. During project meetings with executives, 
union representatives, and others at EnergyCorp, Thomas would take over the conversation by 
projecting on a screen the expected new entities, personnel transfers, and HR savings. Thanks to 
the graphical interface, Thomas could share his “global vision of the project” and “align people 
around it” (field notes, project meeting, September 2011). Once each person’s input was entered 
into the software, it would compile all their contributions and display a simulation of the ensuing 
organizational structure. If the same resource was claimed by two departments, the software 
would highlight the issue. When people contested his choices, Thomas would answer that, “it is 
the tool, in fact, that is doing the job,” not him (field notes, project meeting, July 2011). 
Executives, unable to master details and blinkered by a “silo” perspective, increasingly 
deferred to Thomas to mediate their differences and coordinate among them to reach 
compromises concerning staffing. He was privately invited by each director to help make final 
decisions on staffing issues. During People Review meetings, executives could rely on the tool to 
visualize how the new organization, as a whole, would look, and the impact of various scenarios 
on their own and each other’s departments. These put Thomas in a particularly strong position, 
as he mentioned in his field notes: “As the walking memory of the project, they are even putting 
me in the position of arbitrating conflicts, given that I am the only one with a global vision on the 
restructuring project” (field notes, project meeting, September 2011).   
Empirical Episode 4: “You are only good at putting people in little boxes.” Thomas’s use of the 
People Review tool also led to rejection from several participants. For instance, Benedict, the 
Chief Financial Officer, accused the consultant of being “only good for putting people in little 
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boxes” because of his indiscriminate use of the tool. During a project meeting, he told him: “You 
can write down anything in the tool, but that doesn’t mean it’s workable” (field notes, project 
meeting, June 2011). On several occasions, Thomas faced resistance from Benedict, who felt that 
the tool imposed a very rigid understanding of the restructuring process in terms of predefined 
categories into which personnel had to fit. The chief HR officer, Samira, to whom Thomas 
wanted to give a larger role in the project, told him for her part that “she didn’t need a piece of 
software to do her job” (field notes, project meeting, June 2011). Samira stated that “mastering 
database software wasn’t where she brought the most value,” and that “it wasn’t her job to 
become the technical expert on the tool” (field notes, project meeting, July 2011). 
In view of these two executives’ disapproval of the tool, Thomas ceased using all of its 
calculation functions, and was careful to rely on the software purely as a presentation device 
when working with them. During project meetings at Benedict’s office, he purposely used a 
simple pencil and a chart—even though, at the end of the day, the information would in fact be 
transcribed into the tool. On another occasion, Thomas showed Benedict that the tool’s 
simulations and calculations ultimately rested on data provided by Benedict’s own office, and 
that he could adjust all the parameters to his needs. In other words, the software was not 
imposing any hidden assumptions, and Thomas could change inputs that the executives found 
inappropriate. As for Samira, the CHRO, Thomas later learned from Henri that she worried that 
the ad-hoc computer software she used to keep track of HR cases would not be compatible with 
the tool, and that she would need to learn how to use a whole new application. To assuage her 
fears, Thomas emphasized that he had created the tool himself, and that he could customize it to 
Samira’s needs, and import her data into it. As a result, after several weeks of reluctance, Samira 
agreed that her teams would take charge of the People Review tool—although she remained 
suspicious of it. 
Summary: Equipping, and gearing down from, material artifacts. The two People 
Review episodes show how material artifacts, such as the tool, played a part in the consultant’s 
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contribution to orienting collective action when discussing staffing issues. The tool lent him 
calculative and representational abilities that placed him in a brokering position at the center of a 
complex network of potentially conflictual relations. Yet, material artifacts are not reducible to 
freestanding authority-granting resources; their uses, abuses, and misuses are directly driven by 
the demands of the situation. While Thomas’s relation to the tool was largely acclaimed, as it 
facilitated conversations among executives, the consultant-software duo was also seen as 
constraining by the CFO, or intimidating by the CHRO. Moreover, when Thomas appeared to be 
overly complicit with the tool, their respective contributions might have become 
indistinguishable—as when Benedict accused Thomas of letting the formal frame of the tool’s 
calculations take precedence over sound, “workable” business decisions.  
 As in the episodes concerning Barbara, Thomas managed to unite executives around a 
common reading of the People Review program by aptly modulating his relation to the tool 
depending on each situation’s specifics. At times, Thomas would equip himself with the tool—a 
term that captures the way that the relation rested on the combination of their respective abilities. 
The notion confirms ANT’s idea that knowing or rationality are not located only in cognizant 
humans, but also in their interaction with “calculative devices” (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). The 
case of the tool shows that the same applies to authority: The tool conferred additional abilities 
on Thomas, such as analytical power and augmented recording capacity, as well as ordering and 
visualization functions, which proved crucial when it came to orienting collective action. 
Conversely, we also observe in the episodes that, at other times, Thomas would not hesitate to 
downplay the importance of the tool in order to adjust to the CFO’s and the CHRO’s specific 
concerns. He geared down and separated himself from the material artifact. For instance, he 
would refrain from using some of its functions, emphasize his ultimate control over it, or 
abandon it altogether in favor of pencil and paper.  
Relating with abstract entities 
In addition to relating with people and objects, Thomas also related with seemingly immaterial 
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things such as rules, principles, and methods. These abstract entities either helped him guide 
collective action or prevented him from doing so, depending on the manner of his relation. We 
focus on the abstract entities that Thomas related with as he was carrying out an important IT 
transition project. 
Empirical episode 5: “I scrupulously followed MotherCorp’s auditing method.”  Thomas’s 
capacity to orient collective action was put on trial once again when he was involved in the 
review of EnergyCorp’s IT system—one of the most prominent technical controversies of the 
restructuring project. EnergyCorp’s IT system was considered ineffective and in need of a 
complete overhaul. Thomas’s role was to provide expert advice to EnergyCorp’s CEO, Gerard, 
during the decision process that would lead to the selection of a replacement. Two options were 
on the table, as outlined in the project’s strategic plan. One option was to deploy MotherCorp’s 
system at EnergyCorp, with the project being handled by the global IT services and billed 
internally. The other was to upgrade EnergyCorp’s current system by purchasing software 
modules from vendors and having the local IT team build additional in-house tools. The stakes 
were high, since the system was instrumental to EnergyCorp’s operational work and client 
billing, and the solution represented the single largest cost item in the restructuring program. 
As part of an auditing process, Thomas led several analyses that compared each option’s 
technical specifications, performance, and costs. He based these analyses on different sets of 
data, including various figures, observations, and interviews with the IT team and users. The data 
was gathered not only at EnergyCorp, but also at a MotherCorp subsidiary operating in a related 
industry. During his interviews, Thomas realized that EnergyCorp’s IT Director, as well as some 
technicians, feared that Thomas would favor the first option (going with the MotherCorp system) 
because he doubted they had the skills to upgrade the existing IT system and manage it in line 
with MotherCorp’s standards. To undermine his work, they repeatedly “contested the 
consultant’s authority” (in their own words; field notes, project meeting, September 2011) to 
evaluate EnergyCorp’s IT system performance and that of the IT team. “‘How can you judge us 
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in a few days,’ an IT engineer asked Thomas, ‘when we’ve been working on the solution for 
years? It may not be perfect, but it has done the job so far’” (field notes, informal conversation, 
September 2011). Although Thomas referred to Gerard during several project meetings by 
reminding his interlocutors that the CEO was the one ordering the audit, the IT department 
remained reluctant to participate, and the IT Director refused to share the system’s “technical 
procedures and specifications” with the consultant (field document, September 2011).  
To get the IT team on board with the project, Thomas took care during audit interviews to 
refer specifically to “the MotherCorp method” for auditing IT services—a fully specified method 
including various templates and policies for carrying out an evaluation—and to point out that 
“[he] was only there to apply the method rigorously” (field notes, project meeting, October 
2011). He emphasized the procedural importance and fairness of this method by going through 
its technical specifications during a meeting with the IT team, and also in any written 
presentations and deliverables. In a personal conversation with the IT Director, Thomas insisted 
that he had “scrupulously followed each phase of MotherCorp’s auditing method to reach his 
conclusion,” and that “the method had been successfully applied in other subsidiaries to make 
these kinds of decisions” (field notes, informal conversation, October 2011). Although the IT 
Director still mostly saw Thomas as a threatening outsider, he felt obliged to recognize the 
validity of the conclusions reached via the auditing method, given that he was himself a former 
MotherCorp top manager who had helped craft its IT policies. In front of his team, he 
acknowledged that he was indeed “very familiar with the process and willing to use it at 
EnergyCorp, since he had made sure in the past that it was technically relevant” (field notes, 
project meeting, October 2011). As a result, the IT Director provided Thomas with additional 
insights on how to proceed with the software audits and encouraged his team to collaborate more 
closely with Thomas.   
Empirical episode 6: “I can produce rigorous and principled analysis on my own.” Based on 
the results of the first auditing process, Thomas recommended the first option—implementing 
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MotherCorp’s system— to Gerard, EnergyCorp’s CEO. While it did involve a higher initial 
investment, Thomas argued that the expense seemed justified by “better performance and by the 
expected longevity of the new acquisition” (field document, November 2011), which would 
make it worthwhile harmonizing EnergyCorp’s IT system with those of other subsidiaries. Yet, 
even though the solution was also supported by EnergyCorp’s IT Director, Gerard strongly 
contested the consultant’s analysis, arguing that “something was wrong” in the way Thomas had 
approached the situation and justified his recommendation (field notes, executive meeting, 
November 2011). In an email to Thomas in response to his report, Gerard wrote: “I feel like I’m 
caught between two experts: local IT services and the implacable system of MotherCorp, with its 
own interests. [...] I would like to see an objective assessment by a consultant, and that is not 
what I am seeing right now” (field document, November 2011). Through the grapevine, Thomas 
later learned that Gerard saw his plan as a tactic by MotherCorp to gain control over 
EnergyCorp. The CEO also objected to the cost of the proposed solution, which was higher than 
the in-house option: “Why should I pay two million euros for a system that already exists and a 
project that consists of transferring data into it?” (field notes, project meeting, November 2011). 
Gerard did not recognize the consultant’s assessment of the situation, or the soundness of the 
auditing method. Instead, he blocked the project and remained adamant that it was a MotherCorp 
plot to take control of his subsidiary by infiltrating people and unifying IT systems. 
To address Gerard’s concerns and unfreeze the situation, Thomas announced that he 
would embark on a second audit of tools, roles, and procedures and compare EnergyCorp’s IT 
service to other subsidiaries. This time, he made sure that he omitted any reference to 
MotherCorp’s auditing method. He even publicly downplayed its importance during a project 
meeting attended by both Gerard and IT engineers from the group, by telling them that the 
auditing method “is only good when the data is clean enough to be transferred between systems 
without additional costs, which is not the case here. So, we don’t need MotherCorp’s auditing 
method to guide how we should proceed” (field notes, project meeting, November 2011). 
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Instead, Thomas made it clear to Gerard that the recommended path forward would be based on 
“ConsultCorp’s return on experience” from similar assignments—for instance, “the general cost 
of IT systems, the cost of data transfer between systems, technical risks, and the expected return 
on investment” (field document, strategic memo, November 2011). He argued that short-term 
costs should not overshadow long-term returns on investment, and that the compatibility of the 
new system with the group’s would be an important long-run asset. During multiple private 
encounters with Gerard, Thomas was sure to mention that the continued blockage of this IT 
project could imperil the corporate-wide restructuring program and antagonize MotherCorp’s 
executives. Though the second report ended up coming to the same conclusion as the first, 
Gerard grudgingly agreed to comply with the consultant’s recommendations. While he continued 
to distrust the holding group’s intentions, he stopped his blocking actions against MotherCorp’s 
IT system and proceeded to its implementation. 
Summary: Invoking and revoking abstract entities. In these final two excerpts, we see 
that relating to what we call abstract entities, such as “MotherCorp’s auditing method,” was key 
in eliciting compliance from both the IT Director and the CEO. We use the term “abstract entity” 
to refer to any idea, institution, principle, professional norm, value, way of doing, and so on, that 
may participate in defining the situation when it is referred to in conversation. Indeed, people 
rarely say “I am authoritative,” but rather assert their authority indirectly by pointing to the need 
to follow best practices or standards. In this example, “best practices” or “standards” are abstract 
entities that are selected to lend weight to the speaker’s proposed course of action (Cooren, 
2010). In the empirical episodes, a particular emphasis is put on “MotherCorp’s auditing 
method,” but other abstract entities are also at play: “ConsultCorp’s return on experience,” the 
“long-term goals of EnergyCorp,” the “IT department’s expertise,” and so forth. 
At times, the consultant invoked MotherCorp’s auditing method to elicit compliance, in 
the sense that he referred to it as motivating or aligning with his suggested course of action, as 
when dealing with EnergyCorp’s IT Director. On other occasions, however, the consultant 
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revoked precisely the same method, pointing to its misalignment with the situation, especially 
following Gerard’s rejection of the initial report. In this vein, our data shows that the consultant 
and other protagonists did not bluntly contradict each other. Rather, they counterpoised different 
readings of the situation by invoking or revoking methods, ideas, and other abstract entities that 
they presented as pointing to a particular course of action. Whether the evoked entities are 
objectively valid is secondary to our argument, since even the most substantially accurate idea 
must still be made to count in the situation through relational practices of invocation and 
revocation.    
These six empirical episodes illustrate moments where the consultant’s authority was on 
trial: contested in different ways by a variety of actors. They reveal two important features of 
Thomas’s ability to orient collective action. First, his authority was neither stable nor given in 
advance. Without denying the importance of expertise, rank, and norms in eliciting compliance, 
our analysis shows that these elements must be practically made to count anew in each situation. 
No single resource—Thomas’s charisma, his status, the management mandate he was given, his 
professional credentials or esoteric consulting methods—definitively granted him authority over 
people. As he discovered, what worked in some situations failed in others, and what helped him 
alter operational workers’ courses of action turned out, on occasion, to have the exact opposite 
effect on top managers’ behavior. Authority, the episodes reveal, should be regarded as a 
practical and situated accomplishment that is susceptible to failure; in other words, it is a 
performance. 
Second, the ethnographic data also points to the fact that authority could be performed 
through relating with three types of actants: human allies, material artifacts, and abstract 
entities. These categories neatly sort out the infinite array of people, groups, tools, documents, 
principles, methods, etc., that actors can relate with in order to orient collective action when 
faced with an equally infinite range of unique situations. The consultant related to each category 
of actant through specific movements: either mobilizing or distancing from human allies; 
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equipping or gearing down from material artifacts; and invoking or revoking abstract entities. In 
the following section, we investigate how these movements are specific to each actant, yet have 
commonalities in supporting the performance of authority. 
HOW THE RELATIONAL SHAPING OF THE SITUATION ORIENTS COLLECTIVE ACTION  
The micro-processes of activation and passivation 
A closer study of the interactional moves we identify above—mobilizing and distancing; 
equipping and gearing down; and invoking and revoking—reveals that they all point to the idea 
that Thomas presented himself either as acting with others (whether human allies, material 
artifacts, or abstract entities) or, conversely, as acting alone. This suggests that authority relations 
are distinct from other types because they deal with the intrinsic tension surrounding the 
authorship of collective action (Holm & Fairhurst, 2018; Taylor & Van Every, 2014). From a 
relational perspective, it could be said that when action is shared, the focal actor activates their 
relations with others in the situation; conversely, when others’ contribution is downplayed, the 
focal actor passivates their relations with others. We view these as micro-processes, and hence 
call them activation and passivation. In what follows, we define and illustrate both (1) activation 
and (2) passivation, and (3) analyze how they are dynamic and mutually constitutive processes. 
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of our model and Table 2 summarizes our empirical 
data and reinterprets it through the prism of activation and passivation. 
------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------- 
 (1) Activation. Whether by mobilizing human allies, using artifacts, or invoking abstract 
entities, the consultant put forth his relations to other actants, and, therefore, oriented collective 
action by downplaying his own authorship of the situation. For instance, in the first empirical 
episode, when attempting to maneuver operational workers who doubted his technical relevance, 
Thomas teamed up with Barbara and placed her contribution center-stage; she was his “insider 
expert,” his main source of information, and an active contributor to their joint deliverables. In 
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the third empirical episode, when faced with the challenge of coordinating reluctant senior 
executives on the People Review project, Thomas created a software tool, which he positioned as 
the cornerstone of the decision-making process, even going as far as to maintain that “it is the 
tool, in fact, that is doing all the work.” Finally, in the fifth empirical episode, Thomas 
systematically invoked MotherCorp’s auditing method to overcome the IT Director’s concerns, 
remarking that he himself was only there to apply the method, which emanated from 
MotherCorp itself and had proved successful in the past. In all these cases, Thomas put forth the 
contribution of a wider array of actants to the authorship of the situation. In doing so, the 
consultant gave weight to his directive by suggesting that it was partially, if not completely, 
motivated by others. He also specifically related with actants from whom he expected people 
would be more willing to “take orders”: Barbara, the tool, and the auditing method. Therefore, 
we define activation as the micro-process by which someone foregrounds and leverages relations 
with other actants in order to orient collective action. This, in turns, means that the actor takes 
the focus away from their own contribution to the situation.      
 (2) Passivation. At other times, Thomas relied on a different process to alter others’ 
course of action. When distancing from human allies, gearing down from material artifacts, and 
revoking abstract entities, he symmetrically hid his relations with other actants, reminding clients 
and insiders of his own authorship of the situation. For instance, in the second empirical episode, 
when he was striving to coordinate the work of reluctant executives, the consultant downplayed 
Barbara as a source of ideas, removed her name from key documents, and, instead, emphasizing 
his own part in the formulation of the suggested actions. In the fourth empirical episode, he 
managed to quell the initial misgivings of the CRHO and the CFO about the People Review 
project by refraining from using the tool and, instead, resorting to it as a mere presentation 
device to highlight his control over it. Finally, in the last episode, Thomas gained Gerard’s assent 
by revoking ConsultCorp’s auditing method as the guiding framework behind his suggestions, 
and, instead, underlining his own professional experience in reaching his final conclusion. In 
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doing so, the consultant took authorship of the course of action he recommended and reminded 
others that he was the focal point in the wider array of actants. Passivation, in this sense, can be 
understood as the micro-process by which someone backgrounds and downplays their relations 
with actants in order to orient collective action. This, in turn, means that the actor puts the focus 
on their own contribution to the situation. 
The situational sensitivity of activation and passivation 
Despite Thomas’s best efforts in choosing one micro-process or the other, both activation and 
passivation sometimes failed to orient collective action in the direction he was hoping for. This is 
attributable to the reaction of other actors, the continuous evolution of the situation, or the 
consultant’s occasional misreading of it. When such setbacks occurred, we observed that Thomas 
had to adjust on the fly from one micro-process to the other, to bring new actants into the 
situation or, conversely, to remove them from it. For instance, as illustrated in episode 2, when 
the consultant realized his relation to Barbara had no traction with executives, he downplayed his 
relations with her and put forth a more prominent role for himself in their joint work. The same 
phenomenon occurred in episodes 4 and 6, when Thomas moved from activation to passivation 
of his relations with the tool or MotherCorp’s auditing method to gain collaboration from the 
CRHO and the CFO, or from the CEO.  
We also observed that when the process of activation did not yield the results he 
expected, Thomas did not necessarily resort to passivation. On certain occasions, he used 
activation again, but with a different network of actants. For instance, in the second episode, after 
distancing himself from Barbara, the consultant gained traction over executives by mobilizing 
Henri, invoking sophisticated consulting models, and so forth. In the fourth episode, taking the 
tool off the table when it antagonized executives also meant equipping with a new set of material 
artifacts: a pencil and a simple chart. In the last episode, when the consultant noticed that 
invoking MotherCorp’s auditing method was counterproductive with the CEO, Gerard, he 
shifted to activating a different set of actants—namely, other abstract entities such as 
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“ConsultCorp’s return on experience.”  
The data analysis also shows that passivation and activation must not be understood as 
dualistic opposites, but rather as located on a continuum of two mutually constitutive processes. 
An actor can never entirely diffuse their relation with other actants, because authority only 
makes sense in the context of collective action. When one person seemingly orients collective 
action, they are in fact backed up by a variety of human allies, material artifacts, and abstract 
entities that must be made present in the situation. On the other hand, an actor can never entirely 
hide behind their relations with others, as it would amount to disappearing entirely as an actor. 
Thus, the performance of authority is not reducible to any particular posture. What matters is 
keeping activation and passivation in balance, depending on what the situation demands, and 
thus continuously contributing to its reshaping. The art of the dancer, to use a metaphor, does not 
lie in any one figure, but in the very movement that produces one figure after another, without 
ever staying still.   
 As the consultant activates or passivates his relations with various actants, he is 
attempting to shape the situation in such a way that it orients collective action. A performative 
understanding of authority highlights that the situations encountered by the consultant 
throughout his work are not stable contexts in which passivation and activation occur. Instead, 
the situations were continuously morphed by the consultant (and, arguably, other people) as he 
engaged in the micro-processes of passivation and activation. For instance, in the fifth episode, 
when Thomas invoked the “MotherCorp auditing method” during meetings, he shaped the 
situation by enacting a specific role for such an actant—a role that other people then had to 
consider with particular attention. At the same time, other actants—such as prior auditing data, 
Thomas’s own expertise, and the first report—were moved away from the situation. Similarly, in 
episode 3, when Thomas orchestrated coordination among executives by equipping himself with 
the People Review tool, he made it de facto a key actant to which executives had to relate in 
various ways, in all situations concerned with the People Review project. Situations, in this 
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sense, are dynamic configurations of material (implying people and artifacts) and semiotic 
actants (implying abstract entities). They emerge from the mundane activities of shared work, 
from the details of how tools are used to the vernacular intricacies of speech. Emphasizing the 
continuous shaping of the situation via material-semiotic relations makes it clear that the 
performance of authority involves mediation via the situation. People are not giving orders or 
complying with each other; rather, they are trying to impose a shaping of the situation with 
which actants must align.  
DISCUSSION  
In this paper we analyzed how a focal actor orients collective action by activating and 
passivating relations with other actants in order to shape the situation in such a way that others 
defer to it. Specifically, we found that the performance of authority amounts to relating to three 
types of actants through three symmetrical movements: mobilizing and distancing from human 
allies; equipping and gearing down with respect to material artifacts; and invoking and revoking 
abstract entities. These movements have two underlying micro-processes in common, activation 
and passivation, by which the authorship of collective action is situationally distributed. 
Deploying these micro-processes orients collective action by aligning actants with the demands 
of the situation. 
The performative approach to authority we propose makes three distinct theoretical 
contributions. First, it departs from substantialist approaches and augments the relational 
program on authority (Huising, 2014, 2015; Kellogg, 2009) by pinpointing the micro-processes 
through which relations orient collective action. Second, it engages with ANT and CCO research 
by showing how authority emerges from material and semiotic relations enmeshed in the shaping 
of a situation (Cooren, 2010; Holm & Fairhurst, 2018; Kuhn et al., 2017; Latour, 2005). Finally, 
it provides new insights as to how authority unfolds in non-hierarchical, fragmented, and fluid 
post-bureaucratic contexts.   
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A performative perspective on the construction of authority  
In contrast to previous substantialist approaches, our performative perspective emphasizes that 
authority is not a static “thing,” or the intrinsic property of any specific “source,” but an outcome 
of the weaving of relations in a specific situation. In the case of the position view, authority is 
conflated with a particular location within the hierarchy or the assets that the order-giver controls 
(e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1997). The expertise view, for its part, equates authority with the more or 
less “esoteric” knowledge that the order-giver possesses (e.g., Dobrajska et al., 2015). Finally, 
the acceptance view locates authority in the order-taker’s cognition, and focuses on identifying 
which messages and signals allow one’s authority to be more readily accepted (e.g., Tyler & 
Lind, 1992). Each of these perspectives seeks to single out a clear basis for authority: If you have 
the right position or the right knowledge, or send out the right, acceptable message, then you are 
assumed to “have” authority. Our study reveals, instead, that authority is not reducible to any one 
source or pole of the relation; it emerges from the interactions between participants and depends 
on the specifics of the situation (Emirbayer, 1997; Nicolini, 2011; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005). It 
takes the notion of interest in its deepest etymological sense: The word comes from the Latin 
inter, meaning “between,” and esse, which means “being,” and concerns the links required for 
people and things to sustain themselves among their peers, their project, or their organization. 
When people follow their “interest,” they defer to situations where relations that matter to them 
are put to the forefront. This performative attitude invites a methodological and epistemological 
shift: The point is not to explain why people obey an order, but rather how authority is actually 
done—whether successfully (from a given actor’s viewpoint) or not. 
This understanding of authority advances the relational program set forth by scholars 
studying authority in professional settings (Huising, 2014, 2015; Kellogg, 2009). These studies 
focus on macro practices—such as doing “scut work” (Huising, 2015), producing “censure 
episodes” (Huising, 2014), or creating “relational spaces” (Kellogg, 2009)—used by groups of 
people to engage with each other and perform or resist authority, especially in the context of 
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expert work. By specifying the micro-processes through which relations orient collective action, 
our performative approach provides an integrative theoretical framework that cuts across these 
practices, unpacks their pattern of action, and specifies their situational relevance. For example, 
Huising’s (2014) analysis of how a group of administrative personnel resisted the authority of 
experts through censure episodes is a case of invocation of abstract entities—the goals of the 
organization—that shaped a situation in which experts’ practices were undermined. When the 
author proposes that biosafety experts performed their authority over lab technicians through 
“scut work” (Huising, 2015), she focuses on various instances of activation of a network of 
material artifacts (such as lab equipment) that were meaningful to low-level employees. 
However, scut work seems counterfactual when considering how professionals could perform 
their authority in relation to high-status individuals. This was duly exemplified in our case, in 
which top executives did not value the consultant’s activation of the quality engineer’s 
operational knowledge—as has also been demonstrated in classical research on professions 
(Hughes, 1962).  
In Kellogg’s (2009) study, “spaces of relational mobilization” were crucial to a group of 
surgeons’ capacity to foster institutional change against an opposing group. These spaces were 
material-semiotic hybrids where people mobilized each other, geared up with specific tools, and 
invoked abstract entities—such as their common identity—that were put forth to perform their 
authority. In our case, we observed that the consultant also used relational spaces to strengthen 
relations with a variety of actors (i.e., Barbara, Henri, etc.) yet did not align with any specific 
group, as it would have meant losing the support of the others. Rather, the consultant had to 
dynamically activate/passivate his relations to each group (executives vs. operational workers; 
MotherCorp vs. EnergyCorp), which allowed him to circulate within the organization more 
surely than if he had associated with the strongest camp. Our performative approach, in this 
sense, extends current research on relational authority, by showing that it is also available to 
external actors without a strong professional affiliation or group identity.  
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From a human-centric to a relation-centric view of authority 
Our performative understanding of authority also responds to recent calls to take relationality 
seriously in management studies (Kuhn et al., 2017). We found that people orient collective 
action through the distribution of agency made possible by the activation/passivation of their 
relations with other actants. This does not deny the importance of expertise, hierarchy, contracts, 
etc., but shows that structures and resources, no matter how deep and permanent, must be made 
to count via relational practices in enacted and multiple situations (Kuhn et al., 2017). While our 
performative take portrays authority as fluid and emergent, it can still explain why some people’s 
authority endures across contexts. Actors may be involved in more stable or durable relations 
with other actants—material relations being more robust than semiotic ones, for instance—and 
may be more skilled at sustaining them over time. For instance, the authority of the President of 
the United States appears consistent because it rests on a wide and stable network of people, 
material artifacts, and abstract entities, including a large bureaucracy, courts of law, the US 
Constitution, and the state’s monopoly on violence. But it does not follow that the President’s 
authority has been achieved once and for all: In a sandbox, trying to convince a small child that it 
is time to leave, the President would be just as helpless as the next adult. In a performative view, 
the consistency of authority is, therefore, accounted as an effect rather than a starting point. It is 
contingent, in the sense that it is only “stabilized for now” (Law, 1992) and always at risk of 
being challenged again.  
ANT was the first theory to take seriously the performative nature of sociotechnical 
entanglements and the sharing of action between actants (Callon, 1991; Latour, 1986). ANT’s 
analysis, especially its concept of “blackboxing,” captures how a focal actor acquires authority 
by incorporating the action of others into their own (Callon, 1986). This enrolment is said to be 
truly effective only when the work necessary to hold the network together is hidden or, at least, 
made opaque (Latour, 2005; Law, 1992)—what we call “passivation” of relations. Authority, we 
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suggest, lies instead in the dynamic adjustment between activation and passivation, and in the 
continuous redistribution of agency between actants. It is only when others’ work is not 
completely “blackboxed” that their spokesperson can be authoritative. Otherwise, the question 
arises: On behalf of whom or what are they speaking? Additionally, ANT has been prolific in 
describing the constitution and stabilization of networks over long periods of time, e.g., large-
scale technology projects. In contrast, our interaction-centered analysis pays specific attention to 
emergent situations and discursive encounters. It grounds ANT’s conceptual repertoire at the 
micro level by emphasizing the work done by an actor to navigate contradictory networks of 
actants in organizations, rather than simply joining and strengthening one of them.  
Our findings answer recent pleas within CCO to investigate how authority also stems 
from contributions besides discourse, including those of objects (Ashcraft et al., 2009; Holm & 
Fairhurst, 2018). By considering human allies, material artifacts, and abstract entities all at once, 
we show the importance of teamwork, physical proximity, and the use of tools in complementing 
the invocation of figures in speech to give weight to one’s actions. In doing so, our findings also 
open up the definition of the situation to a broader range of actants besides human co-
conversants (Courtright et al., 1989; Fairhurst et al., 1995). Broadening CCO’s understanding of 
authority also offers a finer look at how authoritative texts, both concrete (the People Review 
tool) and figurative (the “goals of EnergyCorp”), are woven to guide collective action in a given 
situation (Kuhn, 2008, 2012). Through the dynamic tension between passivation and activation, 
figures and texts become authoritative when they are aptly brought into a situation where other 
actants care for their relationship with them. This also means that, at times, authority may be 
obtained by revoking some figures—i.e., taking them out of situations, thus placing emphasis on 
the focal actor (i.e., passivation of relations). Therefore, our contribution integrates the different 
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modalities through which collective action is guided (Cornelissen, Mantere, & Vaara, 2014) and 
invites us to speak of both authority and resistance in the same terms (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). 
A performative approach to authority reveals that the messy entwining of actants is a 
practical concern for organizational members, not just an analytical problem for researchers. 
Debates over material vs. human/social agency in sociomateriality’s program (Orlikowski & 
Scott, 2008; Leonardi & Barley, 2010; Orlikowski, 2010) have dedicated efforts to sorting out 
“whether the social and the material need to be disentangled […] or to the contrary, analyzed 
together via a relational ontology focused on constitutive entanglement” (Faraj & Azad, 2012: 
249). We adopt a different take on this debate. Our research shows that what matters in the field 
is not so much who or what has agency, but the strength of their joint effect in shaping the 
situation. It was only by weaving the relations between actants of different ontologies that the 
consultant could distribute authorship of the situation, thereby orienting collective action.  
Performing authority in post-bureaucratic organizations 
Our study illustrates how people creatively manage to orient collective action despite limited 
pre-existing sources of authority. A core implication of our research is to support calls for novel 
theories in the study of organizing that extend beyond traditional and static perspectives of 
organizational structure, boundaries, roles, resources, or other antecedents of action. As work 
becomes more contingent, an increasing number of managers have become “consultant 
managers” focused on functional integrations, projects, and internal clients. They must cope with 
flatter hierarchies, lateral careers, and the fragmentation of relationships in project-oriented and 
cross-functional knowledge teams (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006; Sturdy, Wylie, & Wright, 
2015). In our findings, acting authoritatively means crossing the traditional fault lines of 
organization theory: internal/external; functional/operational; top management/staff; social 
skills/technical expertise; etc. Due to the fluid nature of post-bureaucratic organizations, these 
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categories are increasingly blurred (Hodgson, 2004). Looking at activation and passivation as 
micro-processes while acknowledging that they may take a multitude of empirical forms 
provides tools to study authority in even the most unstable settings. 
To account for such contexts, we need theories that transcend the classical distinctions 
between a giver and a receiver of authority, or between a superior and a subordinate. In this vein, 
our performative approach shows that authority is not an either/or question, where some people 
are passive while others are active, but rather a continuous accomplishment involving the careful 
blending of activation and passivation to shape each situation. Indeed, the crucial notion here is 
that of situation, which is the common ground for more equal participation, as Mary Parker 
Follett pointed out a long time ago: “One person should not give orders to another person, but 
both should agree to take their orders from the situation” (Follett, 1940: 59). Our performative 
perspective allows us to account for how any actor, even a subordinate, may end up telling others 
what to do, given the right situation. For example, if a doctor’s actions endanger a patient in 
trauma care, a hierarchically subordinate nurse can overrule them by invoking safety rules, 
medical standards, or procedures (Faraj & Xiao, 2006). The performative view of authority does 
not negate the importance of rank, predetermined positions, and expertise. Rather, it stresses that 
these factors are neither homogeneous nor sufficient, and that their relevance emerges from the 
co-constitution of actants and situations through relational micro-processes. In this sense, we 
illustrate the power of performativity when it is employed in organizational contexts to tackle a 
key concept of organization and management theory (Gond et al., 2016). Performativity offers an 
excellent approach to study authority in new work contexts where its usual forms can hardly be 
delineated.  
Finally, our performative approach highlights the contested nature of authority. People 
may contribute to shaping a situation by selectively relating to people, tools, and principles, but 
this empowering effect comes at a price. Selectively altering relations may undermine one’s 
capacity to act as much as reinforcing it, as when Thomas downplayed Barbara’s contribution to 
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their common work to attempt to gain collaboration from executives. Others witness the moves 
of the focal actor from their own perspective, reach their own conclusions as to motive, and may 
suffer a blow to their own role or public image. Thus, taking the performativity of authority 
seriously reveals its political dimension, and invites researchers to adopt a critical stance when 
investigating how organizational actors shape situations to which others shall defer. In this 
respect, future research based on the performative lens is needed for a subtler understanding of 
the power dynamics unfolding in increasingly non-hierarchical work settings.   
CONCLUSION  
Our research demonstrates that people can perform authority even if they do not “possess” its 
usual attributes. As our study shows, a commitment to relating to other actants in each situation 
can provide the chance to be authoritative and overcome liabilities, such as outsider status or 
limited knowledge of the organization. Our analysis of activation and passivation draws attention 
to the idea that others’ contribution is a crucial facet of one’s authority—for participation is 
integral to actions that matter, even though it may be muted or rendered invisible. An implication 
is that it may no longer be possible to provide a step-by-step recipe for authority, given that 
performances always unfold locally and with an element of surprise. Yet, it does create a space 
for sharing the endeavor of crafting, as William James put it, a world “still in the making” 
(James, 1921: 257). 
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Figure 1: The performance of authority through the relational shaping of the situation 
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Table 1: Use of data for each episode 
Episodes  Timeline Key events and data collection  Data 
E1: “I need my insider 
expert.” 
May–July 2011 Informal conversations with the quality engineer, work 
sessions on project documents, and project meetings with 
operational workers 
20 researcher field notes; 7 team meetings with Barbara; 
6 project meetings; 12 project documents; 1 auditing 
report; 3 meeting memos; 3 emails 
E2: “You need to keep her 
at bay.” 
June–August 
2011 
Executive meetings, project meetings, informal conversations 
with top executives, and working meetings with the quality 
engineer 
15 researcher field notes; 3 executive meetings; 6 project 
meetings; 4 team meetings with Barbara; 4 strategy 
documents; 4 emails 
E3: “The tool did the job.” May–October 
2011 
Meetings and work sessions related to the People Review 
project. Field documents related to the tool itself were also 
pivotal 
40 researcher field notes; 9 project meetings; 3 meeting 
memos; 1 People Review tool (Excel); 1 People Review 
tool (Access); 3 strategic documents  
E4: “You are only good at 
putting people in little 
boxes.” 
June–October 
2011 
Project meetings and informal conversations with the CFO 
and CHRO 
10 research field notes; 6 project meetings; 
3 meeting memos; 1 People Review tool (Access); 1 HR 
tool (Excel) 
E5: “I scrupulously 
followed MotherCorp’s 
auditing method.” 
September–
November 2011 
Auditing process of the IT system, executive meetings, project 
meetings with the IT director, and meetings with the CEO 
30 research field notes; 10 project meetings; 3 meetings 
at ConsultCorp; 1 auditing report; 2 policy documents  
E6: “I can produce 
rigorous and principled 
analysis on my own.” 
November 2011 Project meetings on the IT system, another auditing process, 
and multiple conversations with the CEO. The auditing report 
and strategic documents were also pivotal in the analysis 
10 researcher field notes; 4 project meetings; 2 executive 
meetings; 1 work email; 1 auditing report; 2 strategic 
documents 
E7: “I’m in charge of the 
restructuring project.” 
June 2011 Project meeting with top executives on the transfer of 
EnergyCorp subsidiaries 
3 researcher field notes; 1 project meeting 
E8: “I’m here to support 
all you guys.” 
June 2011 Project meeting with top executives on the transfer of 
EnergyCorp subsidiaries and informal conversations with 
executives 
4 researcher field notes; 1 project meeting 
1 meeting memo 
E9: “I used the report as 
my business card.” 
June 2011 Auditing process in production plants and project meetings 
with operational workers 
8 researcher field notes; 3 project meetings; 1 auditing 
report  
E10: “I am the project 
leader.” 
May-July 2011 Project meetings and informal conversations with the CFO 5 researcher field notes; 3 project meetings; 3 work 
emails; 2 meetings with Barbara 
E11: “The success of the 
program depends on it.” 
August 2011 Project meetings and informal conversations with the CFO 10 researcher field notes; 4 project meetings; 1 work 
email 
E12: “The contract is clear 
on this point.” 
September 2011 Several meetings and informal conversations with Henri and 
Charles related to the contractual arrangements of the 
assignment 
4 researcher field notes; 2 meetings with Henri; 1 
meeting with Charles; 1 field document 
E13: “You’ve known me 
for a long time.” 
September 2011 Meeting and an informal conversation with Henri related to 
the contractual arrangements of the assignment 
2 researcher field notes; 2 meetings with Henri; 1 field 
document 
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Table 2: Activation and passivation in the consultant’s performance of authority 
Episode Initial situation Performance of authority Outcome and new situation 
E1: “I need my 
insider expert.” 
Initial situation: Thomas needed to get operational 
workers on board with a new financial structure, 
even though he lacked day-to-day knowledge of 
EnergyCorp activities. This was crucial, since the 
restructuring process could not be completed without 
cooperation from workers in charge of operational 
processes. 
Activation: Thomas mobilized a human ally by teaming up 
with Barbara, the quality engineer, to make up for his lack 
of practical knowledge. He took her to meetings, sat next to 
her, credited her in key documents, had lunch with her, 
emphasized her contribution, publicly gave her credit, etc. 
For instance, he enthused: “Barbara really is my fairy 
godmother on this project. She knows all about the plants 
and the accounting structure of the subsidiaries. I couldn’t 
do this without her” (field notes, June 2011). 
Why activation worked: Thomas’s visibly close 
collaboration with Barbara allowed him to make his 
abstract recommendations relevant for operational 
workers and showed that Thomas cared about their 
concerns. They saw him as more competent, interested in 
technical aspects, and more trustworthy. An accountant 
commented, for instance: “I’m not sure that what the 
project team is doing is best [for EnergyCorp], but the 
fact that Barbara is involved is very reassuring for us” 
(field notes, July 2011). 
E2:“You need 
to keep her at 
bay.” 
Initial situation: In contrast to operational workers, 
senior executives did not value recommendations 
based on Barbara’s insights. For instance, they said: 
“We have known for a long time what Barbara is 
capable of […] and we don’t want that” (field notes, 
July 2011). Henri also explained to Thomas: “You 
must manage Barbara and take a strong lead if you 
want executives to take you seriously” (field notes, 
July 2011). However, Thomas did need collaboration 
from top executives, since each of them was the 
sponsor of a particular project within the restructuring 
process.   
Adjustment to passivation: Thomas distanced himself from 
a human ally, namely Barbara. He began attending 
meetings alone, authoring reports on his own, removing 
Barbara’s name from documents, and emphasizing his own 
role and knowledge of consulting methods and models. In 
an executive committee meeting, he mentioned to 
executives: “Barbara is only here to help me with support 
tasks. I’m the one doing the analysis” (field notes, July 
2011). 
Why passivation worked: Executives reacted positively, 
since they valued expert advice and consulting models 
and had little regard for the detailed engineering 
knowledge that Barbara represented to them. Thomas 
observed increased collaboration from executives, who 
also called for his support and insights, asked him to 
arbitrate during delicate situations, and involved him in 
informal conversations. 
E3:“The tool 
did the job.” 
Initial situation: Thomas had to secure the 
cooperation of feuding executives in order to design 
the target state of the organization and review the 
status of affected employees. The People Review 
project was a high-stakes process that could result in 
many employees changing positions or being let go. 
Executives engaged in intense negotiations and 
disputes to protect their own teams and preserve their 
own resources. 
Activation: Thomas equipped himself with a material 
artifact—the People Review tool—that allowed him to 
simulate, visualize, and record personnel movements. The 
software allowed executives’ suggestions to be integrated 
and then showed the organizational state that would result 
if they were implemented. Thomas emphasized the 
importance of the tool—telling the commercial director, for 
instance, that “it is the tool, not me, that is taking the 
decisions” (field notes, July 2011). 
Why activation worked: The tool’s ability to visualize and 
simulate personnel movements led executives to rely on 
its projections when structuring their departments. 
Thomas gained a key role in the project’s coordination. 
An executive asked him to “come with the tool to all 
department meetings concerning the People Review, in 
order to decide what should be done with other services” 
(field notes, August 2011). Another executive asked him: 
“Can you tell me what we wrote in the tool last time? So, 
what does it say I should do? It is very well structured 
and transparent, this tool” (field notes, July 2011). 
E4: “You are 
only good at 
Initial situation: While most executives appreciated 
Thomas’s approach to People Review project, two—
Benedict (the CFO) and Samira (the CHRO)—
Adjustment to passivation: To unfreeze the situation, 
Thomas geared down from a material artifact (the tool). He 
changed his approach with reluctant executives and began 
Why passivation worked: Seeing that the project was not 
controlled by the tool, and that Thomas could adjust it to 
their needs, Benedict and Samira agreed to participate in 
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putting people 
in little boxes.” 
accused him of relying too much on the tool. They 
felt it constrained them, and blinded Thomas to the 
human reality of the project. They dismissed the 
projected organizational design, and the CHRO 
refused to take over the tool herself when Thomas 
was ready to transition out of the project.  
using the tool merely as a presentation instrument, 
emphasizing his own capacity to adjust its features to each 
executive’s needs. He stopped using the tool altogether in 
meetings with Benedict, and showed Samira the 
compatibility of the software with her existing ways of 
working. 
work sessions. They came to agree that the tool was 
useful. Samira admitted, for instance: “It is very well 
made, this tool, very powerful.” She also noted that “it is 
the tool that helped us win over the union representatives 
on the project” (field notes, October 2011). 
E5: “I 
scrupulously 
followed 
MotherCorp’s 
auditing 
method.” 
Initial situation: Thomas had to conduct an audit of 
EnergyCorp’s aging IT system and suggest possible 
alternatives. Replacing EnergyCorp’s entire IT 
system was a multi-million-euro project, and such an 
investment would determine the firm’s ability to 
maintain its operations in the future. Given the high 
stakes, Thomas had to be careful in conducting his 
audit so as to persuade Gerard, the CEO, of the 
soundness of his advice. He also had to get the IT 
director to collaborate in the audit, despite the latter’s 
refusal to share crucial information and his distrust in 
Thomas’s legitimacy to conduct technology audits. 
Activation: Thomas invoked an abstract entity: In a 
conversation with the IT director, he quoted “MotherCorp’s 
auditing method” to underscore the relevance and 
legitimacy of his own work. He referred to the method as 
guiding his solution and included it in all deliverables. 
Henri remarked, “Because this method is tailored for the 
subsidiaries and well known in the group, it will be helpful 
in pushing the solution forward” (field notes, September 
2011). 
Why activation worked: Because EnergyCorp’s IT 
director had participated in the crafting of the method (as 
a former executive from the parent firm), he felt obliged 
to support an approach that had originally emanated, at 
least in part, from him. He supported the auditing process 
in front of his teams, and shared crucial information with 
the consultant.   
 
E6: “I can 
produce 
rigorous and 
principled 
analysis on my 
own.” 
Initial situation: When the CEO read the IT audit 
report, he interpreted Thomas’s reliance on 
MotherCorp’s methods as a lack of objectivity and as 
indicating his complicity with the parent firm’s 
attempt to take over EnergyCorp. He rejected 
Thomas’s recommendation. As Gerard explained, 
“I’m not sure this method would apply to 
EnergyCorp, or whether we need an external 
consultant to apply the group’s method” (field notes, 
November 2011).   
Adjustment to passivation: Thomas revoked an abstract 
entity by dissociating himself from the MotherCorp 
auditing method. He wrote a new report where he 
downplayed the role of MotherCorp’s data and methods. 
He also better highlighted the contribution of his own 
expertise and experience as a consultant in the formulation 
of his recommendation during multiple meetings with 
Gerard.  
Why passivation worked: Seeing that he came to the same 
conclusion even without resorting to the MotherCorp 
method, Gerard recognized the validity of Thomas’s 
recommendation. He told the consultant: “I admit that the 
recommendation is sound, although I’m still not 
convinced it is the best choice” (field notes, November 
2011). Ultimately, the IT system was implemented 
according to Thomas’s advice.  
E7: 
“I’m in charge 
of the 
restructuring 
project.” 
Initial situation: Thomas organized a workshop with 
the executives, some of whom he was meeting for the 
first time. The group had to conduct an analysis of 
EnergyCorp subsidiaries, decide which ones should 
be transferred to MotherCorp, and specify the 
modalities of each transfer.  
Passivation: Thomas introduced himself as “the consultant 
in charge of the restructuring project” (field notes, June 
2011). He distanced himself from several human allies by 
neglecting to acknowledge that there were other 
contributors involved, and putting himself forward as the 
one who was making decisions and expecting results. He 
proceeded to describe an action plan where each executive 
was allocated a task.  
Why passivation failed: Quite unexpectedly, the whole 
room burst into laughter, with each executive throwing in 
their two cents: “Is that all?” “You’re in charge? 
[Laughs]” “Who are you again?” “And what about us? 
Are we worthless? You work with Henri, right?” (field 
notes, June 2011). Faced with this pushback, Thomas 
realized that the executives resented an outsider taking 
charge of the project without giving due consideration to 
their own roles and responsibilities. 
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E8: 
“I’m here to 
support all you 
guys.” 
Initial Situation: Thomas’s cavalier introduction left 
executives with a bad impression of him that could 
impede their participation in the project. To get it 
back on track, Thomas tried to repair his relationship 
with them.  
Adjustment to activation: Thomas apologized for his 
clumsiness by mobilizing a human ally, Gerard, and 
mentioned that Gerard had seconded him. He then 
mobilized another set of human allies, namely the 
executives themselves, as main contributors to the project. 
He reassured them that he would not make any decision 
without their approval: “I’m here to support all you guys in 
the process. You are the functional experts and your role in 
pushing the project forward is paramount. You’ll be the 
sponsors of high-priority tasks” (field notes, June 2011). 
Why activation worked: By positioning himself as acting 
on their behalf, Thomas reassured the executives that all 
decisions resulting from the action plan would be theirs. 
At the end of the meeting, the legal director, who was the 
sponsor for the subsidiary transfer project, asked him to 
be “in charge of the project” and “coordinate the 
contributions of the team” (field notes, June 2011). 
E9:  
“I used the 
report as my 
business card.” 
Initial situation: Although technical workers regarded 
Thomas as an outsider working for headquarters, he 
needed to work with them on several of the 
restructuring program’s subprojects, since they were 
experts in charge of production processes.  
Activation: Thomas equipped himself with a material 
artifact, namely the report of an audit of the plants that he 
had previously conducted. When he met with workers, he 
would bring out the thick document, thus showing that he 
had been in the field, spoken to workers, and taken the time 
to understand their reality. “Any time I met with 
operational workers, I’d send the report ahead as my 
business card, so they could see I was not so useless to 
them after all” (field notes, June 2011).  
Why activation worked: Technical workers had a deeply 
held conviction that their reality was different from that 
of the head office. They resented “functional experts” 
who actually knew nothing about their world. With the 
audit report, Thomas showed them that his 
recommendations took into account the intricacies of 
their work. As a result, following the completion of his 
audit, Thomas gained the trust of technical workers who 
all agreed to be members of expert teams for the 
restructuring program. 
E10: 
“I am the 
project leader.” 
Initial situation: Thomas needed Benedict, the CFO, 
to provide him with financial data—and “commit” to 
its reliability (field notes, June 2011)—in order to 
create a performance scorecard for Gerard. The CFO 
refused, arguing that that “his role as CFO was not to 
focus on this scorecard,” and that “the opening 
balance sheet was the top priority” (field notes, July 
2017). 
Passivation: Thomas revoked abstract entities by being 
very direct and ignoring the “CFO’s role” that Benedict 
was attached to. Thomas also disregarded the opening 
balance sheet the CFO deemed to be a priority. Instead, 
Thomas explained that, as the leader of the restructuring 
project, he was the one defining priorities and, whatever 
Benedict thought the scope of his job was, he, Thomas, 
needed the data from the CFO. He explained: “I need your 
forecasts quickly to move forward with my assignment; this 
is my decision to make” (field notes, July 2011). 
Why passivation failed: Feeling that Thomas was 
belittling his part in the project, the CFO refused to 
comply, raising the objection that Thomas’s “demands 
were not specific enough” (field notes, July 2017). 
Benedict also viewed financial issues as his turf, and took 
Thomas’s brusque request for data as proof that the 
consultant had little consideration for his role and 
responsibilities.  
 
 
E11: 
“The success of 
the program 
depends on it.” 
Initial situation: Thomas’s relationship with Benedict 
remained in a deadlock for several weeks, during 
which the performance scorecard stayed blank. 
During a meeting, Thomas also understood that the 
CFO saw the consultant’s proximity to the CEO as a 
threat. Benedict complained: “Every time we see you, 
we come back with a grocery list, and we know that 
you have the CEO’s ear and that it will backfire on us 
at some point” (field notes, august 2011).  
Adjustment to activation: Seeing that the situation was 
stalled, Thomas asked the CFO to meet privately, face to 
face. This time, he justified his request for data by invoking 
abstract entities, i.e. “EnergyCorp’s best interests” and “the 
success of the program.” He reminded the CFO that “some 
people want to dismantle EnergyCorp to integrate its 
activities with MotherCorp. We need to avoid that, which is 
why I need financial data to demonstrate the economic 
viability of the project” (field notes, August 2011).  
Why activation worked: By finding common ground with 
the CFO, and putting forward abstract entities that he 
knew his interlocutor held dear, Thomas managed to get 
the CFO to see the broader importance of providing the 
data for the scorecard. In a project meeting, Benedict 
later asked his team to provide Thomas with “any 
relevant financial information that he might be asking for, 
as they were all working in the same direction” (field 
notes, August 2011). 
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E12:  
“The contract is 
clear on this 
point.” 
Initial situation: Thomas had to negotiate a hike in 
the cost of the consulting assignment with Henri. The 
project had turned out to rely more heavily than 
expected on ConsultCorp resources, including some 
oversight by Charles, Thomas’s staffing manager, 
which had to be billed. However, Henri insisted these 
were not needed, since he was able to supervise “his” 
consultant himself.  
Activation: To counter Henri’s claim that “EnergyCorp 
won’t accept a rise in costs” (field notes, September 2011), 
Thomas equipped himself with material artifacts—the 
contract they had signed and a workload management 
schedule—which he showed to Henri. The subsequent 
conversation unfolded as follows: 
 
Henri: There’s no way I’m paying for Charles’s input; I 
don’t want that! We were clear that there would be no extra 
time.  
 
Thomas: Well, the contract did mention the possibility of 
some extra resource. [Showing the documents] Look at my 
workload management schedule as well—I’m completely 
snowed under with work (field notes, September 2011). 
Why activation failed: To Thomas’s surprise, Henri saw 
right through Thomas’s passivation attempt, and said so 
immediately. Instead of deferring to what the documents 
said, he pointed to his and Thomas’s shared involvement 
in reaching the agreement: “Stop hiding behind your 
contract! […] I’m the one paying […], the contract isn’t 
set in stone […] I hired a consultant to help me, not work 
against me” (field notes, September 2011). 
 
 
E13: 
“You’ve known 
me for a long 
time.” 
Initial situation: Following that conversation, 
Thomas understood that Henri felt that appealing to 
the contract or the workload management schedule 
was a disavowal of their prior relationship and a 
strain on their mutual trust. Thomas therefore had to 
repair their relationship so they could carry the 
project through to its conclusion. 
Adjustment to passivation: Thomas mirrored Henri’s 
attitude: He geared down from the contract and the 
workload management schedule, and quite literally took 
them off the table. Instead, he stressed that he was the one 
making decisions, and that his skills and experience made 
him competent to decide whether Charles’s input was 
necessary. He told Henri: “You’ve known me for a long 
time, and you know I would never work against you […]. 
I’m asking you to trust me on this. I know what is best for 
us and for the project” (field notes, September 2011). 
Why passivation was successful: By emphasizing his own 
competence and trustworthiness as a consultant, Thomas 
convinced Henri that his request came from the heart. 
Henri was still not convinced the extra cost was entirely 
justified, but he agreed that if Thomas said ConsultCorp 
resources were necessary, then perhaps indeed they were. 
He eventually agreed to cover the extra costs. 
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Table 3: Additional evidence of constructs  
 Illustrative examples  
Activation 
Mobilizing 
human allies  
“I decided that I would not go to any internal meetings without Barbara in attendance. The execs started joking about it, saying that to get to me you had to go through my 
bodyguard” (E1, field notes, May 2011). 
“I’ve been doing quality audits with [operational worker] for six years […]. He told me that he wouldn’t be speaking with the project team if it wasn’t for me. I know everybody 
here; I’ve worked with them” (E1, Barbara, informal conversation, June 2011).  
“Forgive me if I wasn’t clear enough in my introduction. I’ve been seconded by Gerard; he’s the one who asked me to help you guys” (E8, field notes, June 2011). 
Equipping 
material 
artifacts 
“Now the [People Review] tool is set up, I’ve become a respected voice on everything to do with [the project]. I use the tool as an argument to convince functional directors to 
meet with me, as I can claim to help them structure their ideas better […]. The tool is on everyone’s lips—so much so that Henri and I tried to give it a proper name, but it will 
remain ‘The Tool,’ with a capital T, out of habit” (E3, field notes, June 2011). 
“When meeting with the operational workers, I could use the report as proof that I had been in the field, and [use it] as a reservoir of examples on technical problems. […] 
[Operational worker] didn’t believe me; I said, look it up on p. 39, I’m not making anything up, it’s all in there” (E9, field notes, June 2011). 
“You tell Henri you’re overworked? He doesn’t care, he doesn’t see it. You’re a consultant, pal, it’s what you signed up for. We need to be able to establish for a fact that you 
work too much. […] We need to make your workload factual. Prepare a work management schedule” (E12, Charles, informal conversation, August 2011). 
Invoking 
abstract 
entities  
“The IT director had budgeted the in-house option and feared that outside analysis would reveal the system’s weaknesses. […] So, I started by saying that MotherCorp had 
guidelines and a group-level IT policy. And since EnergyCorp was a newly acquired subsidiary that had to be leveled up to MotherCorp standards, there was no reason not to 
apply these guidelines to the company. […] I felt like I had pretty good backup” (E5, field notes, October 2011). 
“I know this method. I was actually one of the main contributors to designing it with [branch director], so I don’t need you to explain to me how it works and why it is relevant” 
(E5, quote from IT director, informal conversation, November 2011). 
“I know you might think I am undermining you with Gerard, but I’m telling you that I’m working in EnergyCorp’s best interests” (E11, field notes, informal conversation with 
the CFO, July 2011). 
Passivation 
Distancing 
from human 
allies 
“You can’t be the one steering the executive committee meeting while also crunching data and doing support tasks with Barbara. It blurs your image with top executives. […] 
Right now, you must dissociate yourself from her […]. And try to have lunch with the executives sometimes—not just the same people all the time” (E2, quote from Charles, 
informal conversation, July 2011).  
“I understand that we need to position ourselves at the top level. There is a problem with Barbara; she can’t be the one introducing you to executives. I won’t be there either 
before next week, so you’ll have to go and introduce yourself on your own” (E2, Henri, informal conversation, June 2011). 
“My name is Thomas. I’m a consultant in charge of the restructuring program and I’ll be leading the project office. I’ll be the one checking in with you regularly to make sure 
that everything is in order” (E7, field notes, June 2011).  
Gearing 
down from 
material 
artifacts 
“The tool could be useful beyond the restructuring program if HR keep feeding data into it […]. I realized she was afraid of it for technical reasons. So, I spent several meetings 
showing her how easy it was, and [told her] that if she didn’t need it for most of the work, she could just record her decisions in it” (E4, field notes, September 2011).  
“I said to Henri, ‘OK, forget about the workload schedule. This was just a work in progress anyway’” (E13, field notes, September 2011).  
“I know you are a hard worker and that you’ve helped me in the past, but please don’t bring the contract into all this, because this has never been binding between me and 
ConsultCorp” (E13, Henri, informal conversation, September 2011).  
Revoking 
abstract 
entities 
“I didn’t use MotherCorp’s auditing method in the second report, since it was based on subsidiaries that already had monitoring tools for large projects, which we don’t have 
here. We need a much more fine-grained system for small contracts, which are the bulk of our activity” (E6, field notes, November 2011). 
“You’ve done several assignments of this kind, and I’m sure you guys at ConsultCorp have your ratios and tools to assess the system […] That is what I want to hear from you: 
an objective assessment, rather than a presentation of our own method” (E6, Henri, informal conversation, November 2011).  
 “I’m not sure who told you that the opening balance sheet was a priority, but let me tell you that for now I’m making these calls, and I’m the one who has to deliver the 
scorecard by the end of the week […]” (E10, field document, email to CFO, July 2011).  
 
